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Abstract
"Grand jurors are the constitutional inquisitors and
informers of the country, they are scattered every where,
see every thing, see it while they suppose themselves mere
private persons, and not with the prejudiced eye of a
permanent and systematic spy."1 - Thomas Jefferson to
Edmund Randolph, May 8, 1793
"As soon as the [United States] Attorney possesses the
case, the grand jury, judges, and rest of the judicial
apparatus, which I esteem with you, as bulwarks,
will travel in the work according to the forms, which you
Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, High Point
University. J.D. Washington University School of Law; Ph.D.
Indiana University - Bloomington. The author thanks
Julianna Fedorich for her research assistance with this article.
1 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph (May 8,
1793), FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/docume

nts/Jefferson/01-25-02-0632 [https://perma.cc/HKY4-75CF].
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have delineated."2 - Edmund Randolph to Thomas
Jefferson, May 9, 1793
Suppose a foreign nation, with knowing
assistance from Americans, interfered in a United States
national election. Following the election, a criminal
investigation begins. Who is responsible for investigating
and deciding whether the evidence warrants criminal
prosecution? Who decides who is prosecuted? Answering
that question takes little thought. The United States
Department of Justice handles the case. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation conducts the investigation and
works closely with the Justice Department's Criminal
Division and the United States Attorney's Office for
whichever district the crime occurred. Who else could
perform such tasks?
What if, instead, the presiding judge of the United
States District Court for where the offense occurred
impaneled a grand jury and the grand jury, without
assistance from a United States Attorney, investigated
the allegations? Suppose they called their own witnesses
and asked their own questions. Upon completion, they
presented their findings to the court. Only then would the
court involve the United States Attorney, who would
conduct the trial. Rather than the central role they play
today, prosecutors would play no role investigating and
charging criminal activity. They would not be the
constitutional inquisitors that they are today.
This alternative might have been reality had
President George Washington adopted Secretary of State
Thomas Jefferson's approach to federal law enforcement
rather than that of George Washington's Attorney
General, Edmund Randolph. Randolph's proposal placed
2 Letter from Edmund Randolph to Thomas Jefferson (May, 9,
1793), FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/docume

nts/Jefferson/01-25-02-0640 [https://perma.cc/RG3N-A7LM].
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federal prosecutors between the criminal act and the
grand jurors and the court. Once in this position, federal
prosecutors remained, slowly expanding their authority.
Today, federal prosecutors wield more power than
any other government official. 3 Employing broad criminal
statutes and largely unchecked power, federal
prosecutors can select nearly anyone for prosecution. 4

Their
power,
therefore,
emanates
from
their
discretionary authority. As former United States
Attorney General Robert Jackson stated:
One of the greatest difficulties of the
position of prosecutor is that he must pick
his cases, because no prosecutor can even
investigate all of the cases in which he
receives complaints. If the Department of
Justice were to make even a pretense of
reaching every probable violation of
federal law, ten times its present staff
would be inadequate. . . . What every

prosecutor is practically required to do is to
select the cases for prosecution and to
select those in which the offense is the
most flagrant, the public harm the
greatest, and the proof the most certain. 5

3 Angela Davis, The American Prosecutor:Independence, Power
and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 397-98 (2001);
Robert Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 AM. INST. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 3, 3 (1940); Kay L. Levine, The New
Prosecution, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1125, 1126 (2005).
4 See Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM.
U. L. REV. 703, 722-24 (2005). See generally HARVEY
SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW THE FEDS TARGET

THE INNOCENT

(2011)

(providing commentary

on various

individuals selected for prosecution).
5 Jackson, supra note 3, at 5.
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This leads to the key question of who decides
which cases to investigate and prosecute. 6 Who are, in
Jefferson's words, the "constitutional inquisitors?"7
6 As Jackson noted, prosecutors derive their power from their
ability to decide against whom the government's coercive
power will be used. Jackson, supra note 3, at 5. Often, merely
charging someone with a crime subjects the person to
punishment. See generally MALCOM M. FREELEY, THE PROCESS
IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL

COURT 199-215 (RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION 1979) (providing

an overview of the pretrial process).
7 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph, supra
note 1. Jefferson does not define "constitutional inquisitors." In
this article, the term is used for someone who investigates in
an official capacity. See Inquisitor, DICTIONARY.COM https://
www.dictionary.com/browse/inquisitor [https://perma.cc/43TVQAY4]. Therefore, a constitutional inquisitor is someone whom
the Constitution authorizes to inquire and decide upon
offenses. See THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
For example, Alexander Hamilton identified the Senate as the
constitutional inquisitors on impeachment. He wrote:
What, it may be asked, is the true spirit of the
institution itself? Is it not designed as a method of
NATIONAL INQUEST into the conduct of public men?
If this be the design of it, who can so properly be the
inquisitors for the nation as the representatives of the
nation themselves? It is not disputed that the power of
originating the inquiry, or, in other words, of preferring
the impeachment, ought to be lodged in the hands of
one branch of the legislative body. Will not the reasons
which indicate the propriety of this arrangement
strongly plead for an admission of the other branch of
that body to a share of the inquiry? The model from
which the idea of this institution has been borrowed,
pointed out that course to the convention. In Great
Britain it is the province of the House of Commons to
prefer the impeachment, and of the House of Lords to
decide upon it. Several of the State constitutions have
followed the example. As well the latter, as the former,

[202]
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Answers to that question differ. Most would
respond that the Attorney General, as the nation's chief
law enforcement officer, possesses ultimate discretionary
power. 8 Others would assert the President is a unitary
executive and the Constitution gives the President the
duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. 9
A final group would claim that the United States
Attorney in each federal district has that power,
especially in the vast majority of cases.10
The answers differ because federal law
enforcement was one of many questions unresolved
during the Constitution's drafting and ratification.1 1 This
seem to have regarded the practice of impeachments as
a bridle in the hands of the legislative body upon the
executive servants of the government. Is not this the
true light in which it ought to be regarded?
Id.
8 Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal
Government's Chief Lawyer and Chief Litigator, or One Among
Many, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 1049, 1067 (1978); Joseph R. Biden,
Jr., Balancing Law and Politics: Senate Oversight of the
Attorney General Office, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 151, 157
(1990); see also About the Office, DEP'T JUST., https://
www.justice.gov/ag/about-office

[https://perma.cc/TD6Q-BA2

R].
9 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief
Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WAS. L. REV. 521 (2005).
10 Todd Lochner, Strategic Behavior and ProsecutorialAgenda
Setting in the United States Attorneys' Offices: The Role of
United States Attorneys and their Assistants, 23 JUST. SYS. J.
271, 276-81(2002); H.W. Perry, United States Attorneys: Whom
Shall They Serve?, 61 L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 131-34 (1998).
11 JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA 3-7 (2018)

(arguing that the Constitution was not complete once it was
ratified and that its precise contours were established through
early practice).

[203]
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forced those who served during the Constitution's early
years to answer these constitutional questions through
practice. 12 Their actions became precedent for future
situations.

These first constitutional practices created
ambiguity about prosecutorial power. 13 Concerns about
12

Id.

13 JOAN JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR

IDENTITY xv-xvi (1980); Bruce A. Green, Why Should
Prosecutors Seek Justice, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 607-10
(1998) (identifying the need to give a more detailed definition
to the concept of "doing justice"); Kevin C. McMunigal, Are

ProsecutorialEthics StandardsDifferent?, 68 FORDHAM L. REV.
1453, 1453 (2000) (arguing that prosecutors are advocates
similar to civil attorneys thus making their ethical
requirements similar); Nirej Sekhon, The Pedagogical
Prosecutor, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 6 (2014) (arguing that
prosecutors, through their enforcement power, should advance
political dialogue in pluralistic societies). A search of LEXIS
NEXIS for "prosecutor" in the same paragraph as "chief law
enforcement" revealed over fifty such references over a fiveyear time period. In most instances, the reference is to the
Attorney General as the chief law enforcement officer of the
state. There are also numerous references to the county
prosecutor as the chief law enforcement officer of the county.
See, e.g., Amanda Bland, DA-Elect Kunzweiler Outlines
Changes in the Works, TULSA WORLD (Oct. 18, 2014) (District

Attorney is the chief law enforcement officer for the
community); Dan Liljenquist, It's Time for Swallow to Resign
or be Impeached, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Feb. 21, 2013)

(Attorney General is the chief law enforcement officer of the
state). But see Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias,
ProsecutorialNeutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 895 (2004)
(arguing that neutrality is not a useful concept for analyzing
prosecutorial actions because the term itself consists of
contested concepts). See generally Bennett L. Gershman,
ProsecutorialEthics and Victims'Rights: The Prosecutor'sDuty
of Neutrality, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 559 (2005) (arguing
that prosecutors must remain neutral in relations with their

[204]
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potential Presidential misuse of prosecutorial power have
reinvigorated discussion about prosecutorial power.
Some scholars point to prosecutorial abuses and propose
solutions. 14 Others argue that prosecutors have too much
unchecked power and that effectively checking that
power requires new procedures. 15 Federal prosecutors
have received additional attention due to the fragmented
nature of their discretion. 16 In the federal system, the
various constituencies); H. Richard Unviller, The Neutral
Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a Passionate
Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1695 (2000) (describing the
prosecutor's duty to be neutral prior to making the charging
decision).
14 See, e.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER
OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 128-29, 141 (2007); Rachel

Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 896
(2009) (suggesting that prosecutor offices be restructured to
allow for "structural separation" to "ensure unbiased decision
making"); Stephanos Bibas, Essay, Transparency and
Participationin Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911,
952-64 (2006) (detailing the author's proposals for the
perceived abuses of prosecutorial power).
15 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, ProsecutorialRegulation Versus
ProsecutorialAccountability, 157 U. PENN. L. REV. 959, 1006
(2009) (noting that "elaborate procedures, adversarial
submissions, and review by a specialized panel can promote
equality" (internal citations omitted)); Richard Rosen,
Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Discovery
Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 733-42 (1987)
(recommending a variety of changes to how prosecutors are
disciplined for Brady violations); James Vorenberg, Decent
Restraintof ProsecutorialPower, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 156072 (1981) (recommending a variety of policy changes to limit
prosecutorial discretion).
16 See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Roles
of United States Attorneys, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIIM. L. 369, 421
(2009) (citing the fragmentation and localization of state
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Department of Justice and the United States Attorneys
share responsibility for charging cases. 17 While scholars
debate resolutions to the problem of prosecutorial power,
they do so without understanding the prosecutor's
historical development. A small collection of scholarship
exists but primarily focuses on state prosecutors. 18 Even
less examines the federal prosecutor's origins. 19

prosecutorial authority as a model for an improved federal
prosecutorial authority); James Eisenstein, The U.S. Attorney
Firings of 2006: Main Justice's Centralization Efforts in

Historical Context, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 219, 226-53 (2008)
(examining the changes in centralization since the 1960s);
Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, "The U.S. Attorneys
Scandal" and the Allocation of Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO
ST. L.J. 187, 197 (2008) (describing the structure and roles of
the Attorney General office). These articles arose from the
"political" firings of United States Attorneys by the Bush
Administration following Bush's re-election. The debate about
centralizing federal criminal prosecution is not new, however.
See, e.g., John G. Heinberg, Centralization in Federal
Prosecutions, 50 Mo. L. REv. 244, 252-53 (1950) (defining
centralized control in federal criminal prosecutions). Heinberg
begins his article by further quoting Supreme Court Justice
Robert Jackson, who, as United States Attorney General,
discussed the problem of centralization in the early 1940s. Id.
at 244-45.
17 The charging authority between the Justice Department and
the United States Attorneys varies by case type. The Justice
Department makes the decision in cases such as national
security and tax. The United States Attorneys have authority
in most other matters. See Dep't of Justice, Justice Manual:
902.000-Authority of the U.S. Attorney in Criminal Division
Matters/Prior Approvals, http://www.justice.gov/usam/usam9-2000-authority-us-attorney-criminal-division-mattersprior-

approvals [https://perma.cc/WW4K-Y9TR].
18 See infra Section I.A.

19 See infra notes 103, 120.
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This

article

addresses

this

shortcoming

by

identifying the origins of today's problems in a key

decision made during George Washington's presidency.2 0
It argues that the Washington Administration,
particularly Attorney General Edmund Randolph,
adapted the prosecutor's role from that of a private
advocate or minor judicial officer to one who exercises the
government's inquisitorial power, ultimately deciding
whom to prosecute for what. Seeking a compromise
between Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton and
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, Randolph proposed
inserting United States Attorneys between the people
and the courts. Randolph's proposal occurred in the midst
of a series of meetings and correspondence between
Washington's cabinet as they debated how to enforce
President Washington's 1793 Neutrality Proclamation.
The discussion revealed competing conceptions of federal
law enforcement power. Randolph's practical resolution
prevailed and set federal prosecutors on a path that made
them the nation's constitutional inquisitors.
To understand how Randolph arrived at this
resolution, one must first understand the role state
prosecutors performed at the time. State prosecutorial
work
shaped the
Washington
Administration's
perceptions of the federal prosecutor's role. Section II
explains the immediate political concerns facing
Randolph, namely the need to remain neutral between
France and Great Britain, as he considered how to
enforce federal law. Section III details the conversation
between Jefferson and Randolph, discussing Hamilton's
draft instructions to Customs Collectors about neutrality
20 This approach-examining the Founder's actions-contrasts
with an approach focusing on ideological perspectives. For an
example of the ideological approach, see ALLISON LACROIX, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 3-4 (2010).

[207]
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enforcement. Jefferson's reaction to Hamilton's proposal
and his different approach to federal criminal law
enforcement led Randolph to place federal prosecutors
between the people and the grand jury. Section IV
analyzes two issues raised by establishing federal
prosecutors as the constitutional inquisitors. First, it
examines the centralization of federal prosecutorial
discretion. Should the constitutional power to inquire
reside locally with federal prosecutors (i.e. United States
Attorneys) or centrally (i.e. the Attorney General)?
Second, it examines whom the prosecutor represents.
Related to the centralization question, whom the
prosecutor represents implicates the values underlying
criminal prosecution decisions. The final section connects
Randolph's proposal to current debates concerning
federal prosecutors.

I. Criminal Prosecution in the Founding Era

A. Colonial and State Precedents
B. Creating Federal Prosecution - Continuity and
Change
1. The Judiciary Act of 1789
2. The First Federal Prosecutors

II. The Neutrality Crisis
A. First Cabinet Meeting

209

210
218
220
230

239
242

B. Proposed Instructions for the Customs

251

Collectors
III. Federal Prosecutors as Constitutional
Inquisitors

267

A. Centralization

267

B. Representing the United States Government

272

IV. The Practical Origins of Federal Criminal
Prosecution

277

V. Conclusion

286
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I.

Criminal Prosecution in the Founding Era

The first Congress created the United States
District Attorney-or federal prosecutor-as part of the
1789 Judiciary Act. 21 Those drafting the Judiciary Act
walked a fine line between the need to create a strong
judiciary for the new national government and the
people's fears that national courts would deprive citizens
of their rights. 22 This led them to adapt aspects of state
court practice to fit federal requirements. 23 One
adaptation was the public prosecutor. While establishing
the attorney's qualifications, the Judiciary Act gave little
guidance about how to perform the role. 24 This made

21

Judiciary

Act

of

1789,

1

Stat.

73

(1793),

http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/judiciary.html

[https://perma.cc/9PPH-H3EK]. Originally, federal prosecutors
went by the name "United States District Attorney." See, e.g.,
Letter from Jabez Bowen to George Washington (June 19,
1790), FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/docum

ents/Washington/05-05-02-0341
[https://perma.cc/E6HQ-N7
UB]. In 1870, the name was officially changed to "United States
Attorney."

ERWIN C. SURRENCY,

HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL

COURTS 532 (2d ed. 2002).
22 See WILFRED

J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE

JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789 5 (Wythe Holt & L.H. Rue eds., 1990).
23 See LUTHER A. HUSTON, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 4-5

(1967) (asserting that the Judiciary Act borrowed the state
prosecutor system). But see RITZ, supra note 22, at 5 (arguing
that the federal system was a historical novelty).
24 Kathleen F. Brickey, CriminalMischief The Federalization
ofAmerican CriminalLaw, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1137 (1994)
(stating that the original role of federal law enforcement was
unclear).

[209]
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state prosecutors the basis for how United States District
Attorneys perceived their role. 25
A. Colonial and State Precedents
State prosecutors have murky origins. 26 Like
much of the American legal system, the prosecutor
position developed over time and adapted to fit a
community's specific needs. Prior to the American
Revolution, each colony developed its own unique legal
system,
some
more
functional
than others. 27
Consequently, prosecutors played different roles in each
Nonetheless,
system.
some similarities existed. 28
25 Huston asserts that the Judiciary Act perpetuated the
county attorney system employed by the states. HUSTON, supra

note 23, at 4-5.
26 JACOBY, supra note 13, at 3-5.
27 For instance, New York's legal system functioned poorly, had
a poor reputation, and used few professionals. See David H.
Flaherty, Crime and Social Control in Provincial
Massachusetts, 24 HIST. J. 339, 341-42 (1981); Douglas
Greenberg, The Effectiveness of Law Enforcement in
Eighteenth-Century New York, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 173, 174
(1975) (noting the "severe shortage of able nightwatchmen,
constables, sheriffs, jailkeepers, and justices of the peace.")
[hereinafter New York]. Massachusetts, conversely, was highly
functional, had a strong local reputation, and handled many
government functions. Douglas Greenberg, Crime, Law
Enforcement and Social Control in Colonial America, 26 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 293, 305 (1982) [hereinafter Colonial America].
28 Scholars studying criminal courts during the eighteenth
century often do not emphasize the importance of different
levels of courts when discussing the prosecutor's role. This
leads to overgeneralizations when looking at prosecutorial
function. For example, historian Allen Steinberg emphasizes
the private nature of criminal prosecution arguing that
lawyers played a very small role in criminal prosecution during
the late 1700s in Philadelphia. See ALLEN STEINBERG, THE

[210]
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Colonial and early state court systems featured two
levels of original jurisdiction courts. 29 Lower-level courts
lacked formal procedures and mechanisms.30 Upper-level
courts employed grand juries to screen cases.3 1 Cases
with sufficient evidence were bound for trial where
private and public prosecutors appeared. 32 States
employed attorneys general who advised the governor
and handled cases in the state or colony's supreme
court.33

Understanding prosecutorial power during the
revolutionary era requires understanding the courts in
which they worked. Two court levels assumed original
TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800-

1880 25 (1989). Conversely, George Fisher, studying Boston at
approximately the same time period, emphasizes the
expanding nature of public prosecutorial power as a reason for
the beginnings of plea bargaining. See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA
BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN

AMERICA (2004). While this might be explained by the different
state systems, they actually studied different levels of courts.
29 One way to think about this system is to apply Friedman's
theory of high and low law. Lawrence M. Friedman, High Law
and Low Law, 10 FLA. INT'L U. L. REv. 53, 59 (2015). Low law
dealt with informal sets of rules for the masses while high law
dealt with more formal procedures for more serious matters.
Id. Lower-level courts applied low law while the upper-level
courts applied high law. Id.
30 Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea
Bargaining: Criminal Prosecution, the District Attorney and
American Legal History, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 568, 571-72
(1984).
31 Id. at 573.
32 Id. at 577.
33 JACOBY, supra note 13, at 19; Rita W. Cooley, Predecessorsof
the FederalAttorney General: The Attorney General in England
and the American Colonies, 2 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 304, 309-10
(1958).

[211]
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jurisdiction over criminal cases. Minor matters, such as
simple assaults or theft, initially appeared before a
justice of the peace. 34 Professor Steinberg, who studied
Philadelphia's lower-level courts, known as aldermanic
courts, found they informally administered private
dispute resolution while binding over more serious cases
to a higher court. 35 Local citizens brought their
complaints to justices of the peace, who often lacked legal
training themselves.3 6 Professor Fisher, on the other
hand, studied mid-level courts. 37 These courts had
jurisdiction over more serious offenses and utilized juries
to decide fact and law. 38 These mid-level courts were the
official state courts and met at different sessions

34 While the courts went by different names, they performed
similar functions. For example, Steinberg studied aldermanic
courts in Philadelphia. STEINBERG, supra note 28, at 6-7.
These alderman heard complaints and resolved the minor
matters while sending more serious offenses to the state
quarter sessions court for Philadelphia County. Id. at 56-57.
This work is strikingly similar to the justice of the peace courts
Flaherty studies in Massachusetts. Flaherty, supra note 27, at
341.

35 STEINBERG, supra note 28, at 17-18.
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
17-19 (3d ed. 2005); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF
AMERICAN LAW: THE LAWMAKERS 147 (Little, Brown, & Co.
36

1950) ("During most of our national history, the justice-of-thepeace court was the court which the states set up to handle the
small disputes of the average man."); Steinberg, supra note 30,
at 574 (law enforcement dictated by the relationship between
the court and the people).
37 FISHER, supra note 28, at 4.

38 Id.; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 36, at 17-19; Erwin R.
Surrency, The Evolution of an Urban Judicial System: The
PhiladelphiaStory, 1683 to 1968, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 95, 102
(1974).

[212]
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throughout the state.3 9 Criminal cases generally ended at
these mid-level courts because there was no appeal by
either side in criminal cases. 40
In many instances, mid-level courts convened
grand juries. Like with other facets of colonial courts,
grand juries differed between states. 41 Some places saw
the grand jury as a defender of individual liberties
because grand juries had protected those who rebelled
against oppressive British rule. 42 Others perceived grand
juries as instruments of the state who indicted people
opposing the government. 43 In either instance, however,
the grand jury stood between the government and the
people. 44 The work performed by grand juries also varied
by location. In some colonies, grand juries functioned as

39 Fisher, supra note 28, at 6-7; Friedman, supra note 36, at
17-19; WILLIAM EDWARD NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE
ON
THE
IMPACT
OF
LEGAL
CHANGE
COMMON
LAW:

MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 14-18 (1975).
40 FRIEDMAN, supra note 36, at 225.

41 See, e.g., Richard D. Younger, Grand Juries and the
American Revolution, 63 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 257, 260
(1955) (contrasting Boston and Philadelphia).
42 RICHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL: THE GRAND

JURY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1634-1941 21-24, 27 (1963)
[hereinafter "The People's Panel"]; see also Younger, supranote
41, at 257-58 (1955).
43 JACOBY, supra note 13, at 18 (stating that the prosecutor
protected against grand jury abuses).

44 Brent Tarter & Wythe Holt, The Apparent PoliticalSelection
of Grand Juries in Virginia, 1789-1809, 49 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
257, 260 (2007) (discussing the importance of grand juries).
While grand jurors were the formal mechanism for serious
criminal cases and justice of the peace handled minor matters,
as the post-Revolutionary War period began, the people were
seen as the group primarily responsible for enforcing
fundamental law.
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governing bodies. 45 Other grand juries investigated local
problems and presented their findings to the court or the
government. 46 They also heard evidence in criminal
cases, deciding whether the evidence was sufficient for
trial.4 7 In these instances, they returned indictments to
the court. 48 The public prosecutor drafted the
indictment. 49

45 See "The People's Panel," supra note 42, at 3-11.
46 JACOBY, supra note 13, at 18-19; Renee B. Lettow, Reviving
Federal Grand Jury Presentments, 103 YALE L.J. 1333, 1337
(1994). This practice sometimes occurs in the modern criminal
justice system. In Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, a Grand

Jury investigated the state's Attorney General for unlawfully
disclosing grand jury information. After considering the
evidence, the Grand Jury delivered a presentment to the
Montgomery County District Attorney. Following the District

Attorney Office's review of the presentment, the Office filed
criminal charges against the Attorney General. See Jon
Hurdle, PennsylvaniaAttorney General, Kathleen Kane, Denies
Charges, N.Y. TIMES (AUG. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/

2015/08/13/us/pennsylvania-attorney-general-kathleen-kanedenies-charges.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/XCL5-UN8Q];
Brian Wilson, Charges Filed Against AG Kathleen Kane
Surrounding Grand Jury Leaks, FOX29 (AUG. 6, 2015),
http://www.fox29.com/news/charges-filed-against-ag-kathleenkane-surrounding-grand-jury-leaks
[https://perma.cc/C8FKPP7E]. Presentments were not limited to criminal activity. See,
e.g., Dwight F. Henderson, Georgia Federal Grand Jury

Presentments, 1791-1796, 55 GA. HIST.
47

LAWRENCE

M.

FRIEDMAN,

Q.

282 (1971).

CRIME AND

PUNISHMENT

IN

AMERICAN HISTORY 21 (1991).

48 Id.

49 DAVID J. BODENHAMER, FAIR TRIAL: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

IN AMERICAN HISTORY 63 (1992); see Steinberg, supra note 30,

at 575-77 (noting that the public prosecutor acted like a law
clerk).
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After indictment, private attorneys usually
appeared for both sides.50 Attorneys and judges traveled
circuits from county to county litigating criminal cases. 51
An attorney might represent a victim in one case and a

defendant in the next. 52 Thus, attorneys served as both
50

See STEINBERG, supra note 28, at 38 (discussing the
prevalence of private prosecutions in Philadelphia).
51 FRIEDMAN, supra note 36, at 92.
52 This is inferred from the practice in three jurisdictions. In
Philadelphia, a close-knit legal community developed that
included William Rawle, a future United States District
Attorney. Rawle maintained a journal where he recorded cases
he handled. See generally William Rawle Journal, Rawle
Family Papers, Pennsylvania Historical Society, Philadelphia,
PA (hereinafter "Rawle Journal"). Rawle indicated on at least
one occasion that he represented the defendant in some cases
and the "prosecutor" in other cases. Rawle Journal, July 24,
1786. Given the tradition of private prosecution in
Philadelphia, it is likely these combinations worked together
in criminal matters. See generally STEINBERG, supra note 28.

In Connecticut, during colonial times, Jared Ingersoll served
as a Justice of the Peace, a position akin to the public
prosecutor. LAWRENCE HENRY GIPSON, AMERICAN LOYALIST:

JARED INGERSOLL 229-30 (1971). See generally John H.
Langbein, The Origins on Public Prosecution at Common Law,
17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 313 (1973). This was a part-time
position, so Ingersoll likely used his prosecution background to
his advantage. GIPSON, supra, at 48-53, 232. In 1791, in Rhode
Island, Connecticut's United States District Attorney,
Pierrepont Edwards, represented several federal criminal
defendants. See, e.g., United States v. Pettis, No. 83-673 (R.I.
Cir. Ct. Dec. 1784) (on file at the National Archives in Boston).
This resulted in attorneys who did not associate themselves
with one side or the other in the case. While this has changed
in the United States, it has remained so in the United Kingdom
where it is not uncommon for barristers to represent the Crown
one week and a criminal defendant the next. WILLIAM PIZZI,
TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH: WHY OUR SYSTEM OF TRIALS HAS
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prosecutors and defense attorneys. In some instances,
however, the victim lacked the financial resources to
afford a private attorney.53 When this occurred, the
public prosecutor, who drafted the indictment, handled
the case. 54

Public and private prosecutors functioned
together in these thirteen different systems. The colonies
inherited the private prosecution system from the
British. 55 In cases where one person harmed another, the
victim initiated the case. 56 Initially, the victim presented
evidence and the defendant responded. Neither side had
an attorney. 57 Over time, attorneys entered the system,

BECOME AN EXPENSIVE FAILURE AND WHAT WE NEED TO DO TO

REBUILD IT 108-09 (New York Univ. Press 1999); Kenneth J.
Melilli, ProsecutorialDiscretionin an Adversary System, BYU
L. REV. 669, 669 (1992) (identifying himself as a prosecutor).
53 Craig B. Little & Christopher P. Sheffield, Frontiers and
Criminal Justice: English Private Prosecution Societies and
American Vigilantism in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth
Centuries, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 796, 803-04 (1983).

54 JACOBY, supranote 13, at 18-19.
55 JACOBY, supranote 13, at 4-5. See generally Langbein, supra
note 52 (describing the English system's development); Yue
Ma, Exploring the Origins of Public Prosecution, 18 INT'L CRIM.
JUST. REV. 190, 191 (2008).
56 Langbein, supra note 52, at 321-22; Steinberg, supra note
30, at 571; see, e.g., 111. A Bill for Preventing Vexatious and
Malicious ProsecutionsandModeratingAmercements, 18 June
1779, NAT'L ARCHIVES,

https://founders.archives.gov/docum

ents/Jefferson/01-02-02-0132-0004-0111 [https://perma.cc/QL9
H-8WCG] ("and the name and sur-name of the prosecutor, and
the town or county, in which he shall reside, with his title or
profession shall be written at the foot of the information, before
it be filed, and of every bill of indictment for any trespass, or
misdemeanor, before it be presented to the grand jury").

57 See generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF
ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 10 (Oxford Univ. Press 2003)
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representing the victim. 58 The public prosecutor, a
feature of European systems, also appeared in America. 59
In the colonies, public prosecutors handled primarily
administrative matters such as scheduling cases and
drafting legal documents.60 In some places, especially in
colonies with highly functional court systems, public
prosecutors handled morality offenses. 6 1 These cases
lacked identifiable victims; society was the victim. As a
result, public prosecutors handled these cases. Public
prosecutors were not the leaders of the legal profession. 62
Instead, they were often newly admitted to the bar and
needed work.6 3 Ultimately, they were minor judicial
figures who served as administrators rather than
inquisitors.64

Rather than consult prosecutors on legal
questions, colonies, and later states, retained attorneys
general. The colonial attorney general served as the

(chapter one discusses the trial as it existed prior to the
involvement of attorneys).
58 Id. at 109-10.
59 JACOBY, supra note 13, at 4-5; W. Scott Van Alstyne, The
District Attorney -A Historical Puzzle, 1952 Wisc. L. REV. 125,
128 (1952).
60 Steinberg, supra note 30, at 577; Andrew M. Siegel, When
Prosecutors Control Criminal Court Dockets: Dispatches on
History and Policy from a Land Time Forgot, 32 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 325, 331-33 (2005).
61 Colonial America, supra note 27, at 253-54; Flaherty, supra
note 27, at 146-47 (focusing on offenses related to sexual
immorality).
62 See Robert M. Ireland, Privately Funded Prosecution of

Crime in the Nineteenth Century United States, 39 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 43, 43-44 (1995).
63 See id.
64 JACOBY, supra note 13, at 6; Siegel, supra note 60, at 331-33
(at least this is how South Carolina worked).
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English attorney general's colonial representative.65
Their duties included supervising prosecutions for
offenses against the crown and its revenue. 66 Like the
local prosecutors, however, the attorneys filling this role
were not always highly qualified. 6 7 This meant the
colonial governors did not necessarily follow the attorney
general's legal advice, and the crown often resorted to
hiring private prosecutors to assist with major cases. 68

With the transition to statehood, the state Attorneys
General retained their duties. 69 This aligned them more
with the executive than the judiciary because Attorneys
General provided general legal advice to the executive.
B. Creating Federal Prosecutors - Continuity

and Change
Against this backdrop, the first Congress brought
criminal prosecution to the national level. The
Constitution's drafters found the judicial branch one of
the most difficult issues to resolve.70 Many believed a
65 GIPSON, supra note 52, at 47-48; Cooley, supra note 33, at
309-10.
66 Cooley, supra note 33, at 309.
67 Id. at 310.
68 Id. at 310-11; see also Steinberg, supra note 30, at 575-77
(public prosecutors were regularly superseded by private
attorneys even in cases of "great public wrongs" where all
agreed public prosecutors should be involved).
69 Cooley, supra note 33, at 311-12.
70 WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY

OLIVER
ELLSWORTH 32 (Univ. of South Carolina Press 1995); Maeva
Marcus & Natalie Wexler, The JudiciaryAct of 1789: Political
Compromise or Constitutional Interpretation, in MAEVA
MARCUS, ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE
JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789 13, 13 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992); RITz,
supra note 22, at 5.
REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND
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strong national judiciary posed only slightly less danger
than a monarch. 71 During the revolutionary years, the
British used the courts to control the colonists. 72 This led
people to equate despotic power with strong, centralized

courts. 73 Others believed only strong national courts
could prevent state judges from refusing to enforce
federal laws or failing to protect federal interests. 74 This
caused Constitutional Convention delegates to leave the
details of the federal courts vague, creating only a
Supreme Court with original and appellate jurisdiction
but

limiting

its

subject-matter jurisdiction.75

The

Constitution also granted Congress the power to create
inferior federal courts. 76

71 See RITZ, supra note 22, at 5.
72 Jon P. McLanahan, The 'True" Right to Trial by Jury: The
Founders'Formulationand its Demise, 111 W.VA. L. REV. 791,
799-802 (2009) (describing the importance of colonial juries in
resisting British judicial authority).
73 Gerhard Casper, The Judiciary Act of 1789 and Judicial
Independence, in MARCUS, supra note 70, at 283, 289-91.
74 Casto, supra note 70, at 11; Leonard Dupee White, The

Federalists: A Study in Administrative History, 1789-1891,
392-94 (Macmillan 1956).
75 U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2; see also HURST, supra note 36, at
108 (stating that all agreed a Supreme Court was necessary to
protect federal interests).
76 U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1; see also HURST, supra note 36, at
108 (stating that many objected to Congress having power to
create inferior federal courts).
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1. The Judiciary Act of 1789
When the First Congress met, creating lower
federal courts was a top priority.77 When drafting the
Judiciary Act, Congress understood it was working with
a new government system. It was republican in nature,

meaning that the people were sovereign. 78 It was also a
federal system where both the states and the national
government exercised sovereign power. 79 They also knew
that their constituents held competing beliefs about these
concepts. 8 0 Many opposed the new national government,

fearing, among other things, a centralized national
judiciary. These divisions influenced how Congress
organized the lower federal courts.
Congress created two levels of lower courts,
essentially replicating the system used in several
states. 81 The lower level was the district court. Each state
77 David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The First
Congress and the Structure of Government,

1789-1791, 2 U.

CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 161, 208 (1995).
78 Everyone agreed the "people" were sovereign. The problem
was that not everyone agreed upon what this meant. See Akhil
Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government:
Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Problem of the
Denominator, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 749, 750 (1994).
79 For an overview of the scholarship relating to this issue and
the origins of the federalism concept, see LACROIX, supra note
20, at 1-11.
80 See Marcus & Wexler, supra note 70, at 13-15.
81 Some scholars assert that the federal judiciary was unique
and innovative and that the states eventually copied it. See
CASTO, supra note 70, at 45 (federal circuit courts were a major
innovation); RITZ, supra note 22, at 5 ("[t]he national judicial
system established in 1789 was a historical novelty. It was not
modeled on the state systems; instead, the state systems have
subsequently been modeled on it."). However, scholarship on
the state courts at the time reflects a curiously similar
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had its own district court with a single judge presiding. 82
This court worked similarly to justice of the peace courts.
Those with criminal complaints could appear before the
district court. 83 If the crime carried minimal punishment,
the district court could hear the case. 840therwise, the
district court could only bind the case for trial in the midlevel court, the circuit court. 85 There were three circuit
courts, one for the eastern states, one for the middle
states, and one for the southern states. 86 During the
course of a year, the circuit court met twice in each
state. 87 The circuit court initially featured three judges,
two Supreme Court Justices and the district court judge
from that state. 88 The circuit court, unlike today's circuit

structure. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 36, at 17; NELSON,

supra note 39, at 15-18.
82 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 3, 1 Stat. 73 (1793), http://me
mory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=
001/lls1001. db&recNum=196_[https://perma. cc/GQ9N-GVRM].
83 Id. § 9, 1 Stat. at 76.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.

§ 4, 1 Stat. at 74. The Eastern Circuit included

Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, Rhode Island, and New
York. The Middle Circuit included Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia. The Southern Circuit
included North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia.
Kentucky, upon admission to the Union, became its own
Circuit. 2 MAEVA MARCUS, THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1897 2 n.3

(Columbia Univ. Press 1988).
87

§ 4, 1 Stat. at 74.

88 Id. at 74-75. In 1793, Congress permitted the circuit courts
to hold sessions with only one Supreme Court Justice. 1
CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES

HISTORY 1789-1835 89 (Little, Brown & Co. 1926).
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court, was a trial court, having jurisdiction over all
federal criminal matters. 89
Congress created these courts hoping to pacify
citizen fears that the new federal government would
transport defendants to the national capital for trial.9 0
The public saw criminal prosecution as a local matter. 91
Defendants could easily defend themselves with
witnesses. If trials took place far from the offense
location, only the wealthiest defendants would be able to
secure witnesses. 92 With local juries, jurors and
defendants held similar beliefs, and the juries judged
defendants based on local standards.9 3 Creating local
federal courts to try federal offenses allowed federal
defendants to stand trial before their home-state jurors.
Congress further protected defendants by permitting
each state to use its own jury selection method. 94
In addition, Congress created two new federal
positions to give federal law enforcement a local flavor.
First, each district had a United States marshal who had

89

§ 4, 1 Stat. at 74.

90 Marcus & Wexler, supra note 70, at 21.
91 FRIEDMAN, supra note 47, at 37; NELSON, supra note 39, at

3-4, 14-15; Steinberg, supra note 30, at 573-74.
92 RITz, supra note 22, at 6. The circuit courts were essentially
the compromise to this problem. If a person was tried before
the district court and found guilty, the person would secure a
re-trial in the circuit court without having to leave the district.
Id. at 6, 27. As the Supreme Court only had appellate
jurisdiction in such cases, there was no concern that a new trial
would take place at the nation's capital. Id. at 36-40.
93 Id. at 6, 30.
94 Marcus & Wexler, supranote 70, at 23.
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a variety of court-administration duties. 95 Second, each
district had its own United States District Attorney. 96
Section 35 of the Judiciary Act defined the District
Attorney's qualifications and duties. The District
Attorney had to be "learned in the law." 97 This meant that
the prosecutor had to be admitted to the bar after
studying law. 98 This brought a sense of professionalism
95 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,

§ 27, 1 Stat. 73, 87,

http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=

001/lls1001.db&recNum=210
[https://perma.cc/4U9C-3ZWJ].
The marshal was responsible for executing all written orders
of the United States government. This included the Judiciary,
Executive, and Legislative branches. Marshals distributed
copies of new laws, handled court finances, and were
supervised by the Secretary of State. See FREDERICK S.
CALHOUN, THE LAWMEN: UNITED STATES MARSHALS AND THE

DEPUTIES, 1789-1989 15-21 (Smithsonian Institution Press
1989). Like the United States District Attorneys, the marshals
worked with all three branches. Also like the judges and
attorneys, Washington appointed men who were locally
prominent, knowing that these people would represent the
federal government in distant places throughout the United
States. Id. at 12.
96 § 35, 1 Stat. at 92.
97 Id. "And there shall be in each district a meet person learned
in the law to act as attorney for the United States in such
district, who shall be sworn or affirmed to the faithful
execution of his office, whose duty it shall be to prosecute in
such district all delinquents for crimes and offenses, cognizable
under the authority of the United States, and all civil actions
in which the United States shall be concerned, except before
the Supreme Court in which district it shall be holden." Id. At
the state level, many who served as lawyers were not
necessarily legally trained. For more on the status of the legal
profession at this time, see FRIEDMAN, supranote 36, at 53-60.
98 Colonial America, supra note 27, at 275; STEINBERG, supra
note 28, at 43; Surrency, supranote 38, at 741 (discussing the
significance of the "learned in the law" language).
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to the courts. At the state level, many judges and
prosecutors lacked legal training.9 9The federal attorney
was to prosecute "all delinquents for crimes and offences"
arising under the authority of the United States in their
district.iO They also represented the United States in
civil actions.ii Their duties ended at the circuit courts
though, because the Attorney General handled Supreme
Court cases.i0 2 As compensation, the District Attorneys
received fees based on the type and number of cases
handled.i 3
99 Surrency, supranote 38, at 741.
100

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,

§ 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92,

https://memory.loc. gov/cgi-

bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=001/lls1001.db&recNum=21
5 [https://perma.cc/F32P-DNYH]. This gave a local element to
criminal

prosecution.

However,

by creating

an Attorney

General and then not giving the Attorney General control over
the local prosecutors, Congress created a tension in federal
criminal law enforcement that remains today. Should federal
prosecutorial discretion be left at the local level or should it be
centralized? See, e.g., Eisenstein, supra note 16, at 221.

§ 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92.
Id.
103 Id. The fee-based compensation created an incentive for
these part-time attorneys to work on the government's behalf.
The more cases they filed, the more payment they received.
101
102

NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO,

AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE

SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT,

1780-1940

255-56 (Yale Univ. Press 2013). Assuming Professor Parillo is
correct, this raises a question about why the Administration
was concerned that the United States Attorneys might not
enforce neutrality. If the government paid them sufficiently,
then they would enforce the law. Yet, several attorneys also
submitted bills to the government for services rendered outside
of the traditional case processing duties. See Letter from
Edmund Randolph to Alexander Hamilton (July 2, 1794),
FOUNDERS ONLINE , https://founders.archives.gov/documents/

Hamilton/01-16-02-0540

[https://perma.cc/QPT9-HHK3]
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These

few

provisions

implications.10 4 First,

the

act

two

important

effectively

had

eliminated

private prosecution from federal criminal cases,
differentiating state and federal prosecutors.10 5 In state
Letter from Richard Harison to Alexander Hamilton (June 28,
1791), FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/docum

ents/Hamilton/01-16-02-0540 [https://perma.cc/ZY3V-UCSU].
104 The scholarship on the regular practices of the first United
States District Attorneys is severely lacking. What exists
consists mostly of broad generalizations or is confined to very
limited situations. For example, Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau
explored the workings of Kentucky's United States District
Attorneys for a period of twenty-seven years in the larger
context of the work of the Kentucky federal courts. See
generally MARY K. BONSTEEL TACHAU, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE

EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-1816 (Princeton Univ. Press 1978).
Kentucky was hardly representative of the coastal states
during the early 1790s. Kentucky was the only jurisdiction to
have multiple people decline to serve as United States District
Attorney. Scott Ingram, George Washington's Attorneys: The
PoliticalSelection of United States Attorneys at the Founding,
39 PACE L. REv. 163, 211 (2018) (citing MARY K. BONSTEEL
TACHAU, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: KENTUCKY,

1789-1816 101 (Princeton Univ. Press 1978)). Another study
looks at federal prosecutions across a larger geographic range
but begins with the Jeffersonian period. See DWIGHT F.
HENDERSON,
CONGRESS,
COURTS, AND CRIMINALS: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, 1801-1829 7-16

(Greenwood Press 1985). With Jefferson's presidential election
came a significant change in government philosophy. See
STANLEY ELKINS & ERIK MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM:

THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC,

1789-1800 13-28 (Oxford

Univ. Press 1995). Due to the lack of scholarship in the area,
the conclusions stated here are based on my study of the
Pennsylvania District Court and the proceedings of the Middle
Circuit in Philadelphia.
105 While it formally removed private prosecution, it did not
prevent the United States District Attorneys from hiring
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courts, private individuals brought complaints to the
courts and hired private attorneys to pursue the claims;
however, the Judiciary Act required United States
District Attorneys to handle all federal criminal cases
that went to trial.10 6 This is indicated by the language
that District Attorneys prosecute all delinquents for
crimes cognizable under United States authority. For a
private criminal action to proceed beyond the grand jury,
the District Attorney had to act upon it. Second, the
people who filled the District Attorney position had to
maintain a private clientele.10 7 An attorney could not
survive professionally solely on fees generated from
government cases. The court met only a few days each
year.108 While the federal prosecutor had a monopoly over

special assistants, who were private attorneys, to prosecute

specific cases. For example, in 1807, the government expended
much effort to bring former Vice President Aaron Burr to trial.
See Douglas Linder, The Treason Trial of Aaron Burr (2007),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1021331 [https://perma.cc/VPF8-KL
D9] (article available for download). During the trial, Charles
Lee, the Attorney General under Adams, and William Wirt, a
future attorney general from Maryland, assisted the
government. Id. Citizens also had the power to initiate cases
before the district courts and the grand juries.
106

Id.

Richard Harison, the United States District Attorney for
New York, Christopher Gore, the United States District
Attorney for Massachusetts, and William Rawle, the United
States District Attorney for Pennsylvania, worked in the
largest cities in the United States and likely had the most
money generated from fees. Even this trio maintained a private
practice. See also Roger Conner et al., The Office of U.S.
Attorney and Public Safety: A Brief History Preparedfor the
"ChangingRole of U.S. Attorneys' Offices in Public Safety"
Symposium, 28 CAP. U. L. REv. 753, 754-55 (2000).
108 See, e.g., MARCUS, supranote 86, at 164 (describing the term
of New Jersey's 1791 Circuit Court).
107
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federal prosecutions, 109 the limited work restricted
federal prosecutorial power by necessitating that the
attorneys find other clients, making their position parttime.

The arrangement established a simple attorneyclient relationship between the government and the
District Attorney. The District Attorney attended court
when in session, represented the United States in any
civil or criminal cases, and then handled private business
until the next session.110 There was no policy function.
There was no sense that the District Attorney was the
district's chief federal law enforcement official."' When a
federal criminal case arose, the District Attorney drafted
the indictment and presented the evidence.1 1 2 This
Attorney's
civil
with
the
District
coincided
responsibilities. If someone owed the government money,
for instance, the District Attorney handled the collection
proceedings.1 1 3 In this respect, the District Attorney
simply was a private attorney who counted the United
States government as a client.

109 PARILLO, supra note 102, at 255-56.
110 Cf. Krent, supra note 121, at 292-95 (asserting that private

citizens could initiate complaints). While they could initiate
complaints, a United States District Attorney had to proceed
on the case. See Scott Ingram, Representing the United States
Government: Reconceiving the Federal Prosecutor's Role
Through a HistoricalLens, 31 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 293, 324-27 (2017) (discussing how only cases pursued

by the United States District Attorney were pursued in court).
111 See discussion supra note 8.
112 See, e.g., Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1115 (Pa. D.
1793).
113 See, e.g., "Original Minutes of the Circuit Court of the
United States of America for the Middle Circuit from October
1790 to April 1799" (on file with the National Archives in
Philidelphia).
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In addition to the District Attorneys, § 35 of the
Judiciary Act established the Attorney General.11 4 Like
the District Attorneys, the Attorney General had to be
learned in the law.11 5 The Attorney General was "to
prosecute and conduct all suits in the Supreme Court ...
"116 Under today's usage, one would conclude this means
that the Attorney General handled criminal cases in the
Supreme Court. However, based on usage at the time,
prosecute meant initiating the case and could refer to
civil cases.11 7 Therefore, the "prosecute" language did not
give the Attorney General control over federal criminal
114

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,

§ 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92,

http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-

bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=001/lls1001.db&recNum=21
5 [https://perma.cc/F32P-DNYH] ("And there shall also be a
meet person learned in the law to act as attorney-general for
the United States, who shall be sworn or affirmed to faithful
execution of his office; whose duty it shall be to prosecute and
conduct all suits in the Supreme Court in which the United
States shall be concerned, and to give his advice and opinion
on questions of law when requested by the President of the
United States, or when requested of any of the heads of the
departments, touching any matters that may concern their
departments, and shall receive such compensation as shall by
law be provided.").
11 Id.
116

Id.

See, e.g., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 472 (1793) (Chief
Justice John Jay stating, "It is agreed, that one free citizen may
sue any number on whom process can be conveniently
117

executed; nay, in certain cases one citizen may sue forty

thousand; for where a corporation is sued, all the members of
it are actually sued, though not personally, sued. In this city
there are forty odd thousand free citizens, all of whom may be
collectively sued by any individual citizen. In the State of
Delaware, there are fifty odd thousand free citizens, and what
reason can be assigned why a free citizen who has demands
against them should not prosecute them?").
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prosecutions. Beyond the language difference, the
Supreme Court lacked constitutional authority to hear
criminal cases, unless they involved ambassadors or
other public ministers and consuls, because the Supreme
Court only had appellate jurisdiction.1 1 8

The Judiciary Act then gave the Attorney General
an additional function. The Attorney General would give
"his advice and opinion upon questions of law."1 1 9 This
duty differentiated the Attorney General's relationship
with the government from the District Attorney's. The

attorney general served as a legal advisor, assisting the
government rather than someone who appeared only
when court was in session. Yet, like the District
Attorneys, the attorney general was not full-time. While
the Judiciary Act established fixed compensation instead
of a fee-based schedule, the amount curtailed the
incumbent's ability to give government work full-time
attention. 120

118 U.S. Const. art. III,
119

§ 2.

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,

§ 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92,

http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/judiciary.html.
120 HUSTON, supra note 23, at 5.
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2. The First Federal Prosecutors 121

Soon after Washington signed the Judiciary Act,
he filled the new judiciary positions. 122 Washington
See Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law
Enforcement: Some Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV.
275, 293 (1989) (discussing the role of federal prosecutors
under the Judiciary Act). The work of federal prosecutors
during the Early Republic period has received scant scholarly
attention. When scholars have examined their work, it has
been done as part of a larger study. Most recently, legal
scholars have focused on the executive's power to not enforce
the law. See, e.g., Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial
Discretionin FederalLaw: Origins and Development, 6 SETON
HALL CIR. REV. 1, 4-6 (2009); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement
Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 747
(2014). Prior to that scholars expounded on the separation of
powers between the judiciary and executive. See, e.g., Susan
Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in our
Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There was
Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 567-68 (1989). Historians
discuss how prosecutors handled particular types of crimes or
how the government addressed a particular problem.
Examples include the Whiskey Rebellion and Sedition
121

prosecutions. See, e.g., THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY
REBELLION:

FRONTIER

REVOLUTION

192-204 (Oxford Univ. Press

EPILOGUE

TO

THE

AMERICAN

1988); JAMES

MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION

LAWS AND AMERICA'S CIVIL LIBERTIES, 1798 177 (Cornell Univ.

Press 1956). These studies have not analyzed prosecutorial
powers but simply describe their actions.
122 Letter from George Washington to the United States Senate
(Sept.

24,

1789),

FOUNDERS

ONLINE,

http://founders.

archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-04-02-0053. The next
day, he made initial selections for New York and New Jersey
and appointed Attorney General Randolph. Letter from George
Washington to the United States Senate (Sept. 25, 1789),
FOUNDERS

ONLINE,

http://founders.archives.gov/documents/

Washington/05-04-02-0058 [https://perma.cc/M3SF-FBVF].
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keenly understood these initial selections were precedent
setting. 12 3 He sought those loyal to the national
government and who had strong local reputations. 124 The
people filling the judicial positions would be the new
federal government's face in their respective districts.
His District Attorney nominees included Pierpont
Edwards, who would serve for sixteen years and as a
federal judge for twenty more; 125 Christopher Gore, who
would later serve as Massachusetts governor and United
Alexander
Harison,
States
Senator; 126 Richard
127
Hamilton's former law partner;
and John Marshall, the

123 Letter from George Washington to Edmund Randolph (Sept.
28,

1789),

FOUNDERS

ONLINE,

http://founders.archives

.gov/documents/Washington/05-04-02-0073
[https://perma.cc/RHW6-8W2H] ("Impressed with a conviction
that the due administration of justice is the firmest pillar of
good government, I have considered the first arrangement of
the judicial department as essential to the happiness of our
country and to the stability of its' political system-hence the
selection of the fittest characters to expound the laws, and
dispense justice, has been an invariable object of my anxious
concern."); see also GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A
HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-1815 86-88 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2009); Ingram, supra note 104, at 189.
124 WOOD, supra note 123, at 107-09.

125 Charles Heckman, A Jeffersonian Lawyer and Judge in
Federalist Connecticut: The Career of Pierpont Edwards, 28
CONN. L. REV. 669 (1996).
126 BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONG., Gore,
Christopher, (1758-1827), CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.

gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=G000322 [https://perma.cc/UD
Q9-3JKF].
127 See Richard Harison Halts Vermont Statehood, Founder
Day, https://www.founderoftheday.com/founder-of-the-day/har
ison [https://perma.cc/T9RC-EJZL].
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future

Supreme

Court

Chief

Justice. 128

Edmund

Randolph received the Attorney General nomination. 129
Randolph came from a prominent Virginia legal family,
had been a leading member of the Constitutional
Convention and, although he initially opposed the
Constitution, played an important role in Virginia's
ratification. 130
Although Washington consulted local officials for
nomination recommendations, he nominated people
without consulting them. George Nicholas, James
Madison's
friend,
declined
the nomination for
Kentucky. 13 1 Washington's second choice, James Brown,
also refused the nomination. 132 Edmund Randolph took
several months to respond to Washington's nomination
before ultimately accepting it.133 John Marshall also

declined his nomination, stating it would interfere with
his state court business. 134 Despite these few failures,
128 Letter from John Marshall to George Washington (Oct. 14,
1789), FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/docume

nts/Washington/05-04-02-0130 [https://perma.c/3937-PKW7].
129 Letter from George Washington to the United States
Senate, supra note 122.
130 JOHN J. REARDON, EDMUND RANDOLPH: A BIOGRAPHY, 10-

12, 96-98, 114-19, 125-27 (MacMillan 1975).
131 TACHAU, supra note 104, at 66-70 (discussing the numerous
people who had rejected the Kentucky position).
132 Id.
133 REARDON, supra note 130, at 179-80.
134 Letter from John Marshall to George Washington, supra
note 128. Apparently Washington spoke with a Samuel Griffin
about various Virginians who would serve ably in the national
judicial offices. Griffin put together a list, including Marshall.
Conversation with Samuel Griffin, 9 July 1789, FOUNDERS

ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/
05-03-02-0075 [https://perma.cc/S4M9-A5G7]. This would be
the first of three federal appointments that Marshall declined.
See DAVID SCOTT ROBARGE, A CHIEF JUSTICE'S PROGRESS: JOHN
MARSHALL FROM REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA TO THE SUPREME
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many of Washington's initial appointments served
several years, leaving only for more prestigious federal
appointments. 135

The new District Attorneys encountered two
significant problems. First, they had little business. Most
of their work involved dealing with revenue matters,

including forfeitures and collection actions. 136 Few
prosecuted many criminal cases because the extent of
federal criminal jurisdiction was ambiguous. 137 Some
believed the federal government possessed common law
criminal jurisdiction. 1 38 Others asserted the government

COURT (Greenwood Press 2000). Washington sought to make
Marshall Attorney General, and Adams sought to make
Marshall an Associate Supreme Court Justice. Id.
135 See generally Ingram, supra note 104; ARCHIVE OF SENATE

JOURNALS FROM 1789-1801, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/
amlaw/lwsjlink.html [https://perma.cc/S2LL-E66D] (providing

links to journals from this time period).
136 MARCUS, supra note 86, at 8-9 (describing the work of the
Circuit Courts during their first term); WARREN, supra note 88,
at 58-63 (describing the work performed in the circuit courts).
137 See, e.g., Robert C. Palmer, The Federal Common Law of
Crime, 4 L. & HIST. REV. 267, 272 (1986); Kathryn Preyer,
Jurisdictionto Punish: FederalAuthority, Federalism and the
Common Law of Crimes in the EarlyRepublic, 4 L. & HIST. REV.
223, 263 (1986) (both articles argue against a federal common
law of crimes and describe the historical debate about the
matter). But see CASTO, supra note 70, at 129-30 (pointing to
an example of a federal common law crime occurring on the
high seas; at the time the case was commenced, the Crimes Act
had not been passed).
138 Stephen B. Presser, The Supra-Constitution, the Courts,
and the Federal Common Law of Crimes: Some Comments on
Palmer and Preyer, in 4 LAw & HIST. REV. 325, 326 (1986)
(listing the early Supreme Court Justices who endorsed a
common law of crime).
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could only prosecute violations of federal statutes. 139
While Congress passed an initial crimes law, the law
covered few matters. 140 Most early criminal cases
involved crimes occurring on the high seas. In the District
of Pennsylvania, prior to 1793, nearly every case
prosecuted involved a murder, assault, or theft on a
maritime vessel. 14 1 Grand juries met in each district but
were soon discharged for lack of business. 142
Their second problem dealt with the United
States District Attorney's relationship with the
Executive. 143 How much control should the central
139 See, e.g., Preyer, supra note 137, at 227-28 (citing grand

jury charges defining the scope of criminal jurisdiction).
140 Crimes Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 112 (1790), reprinted
in MARCUS,
supra note 86, 528-35. For a discussion of the scope of the
Crimes Act, see Adam H. Kurland, FirstPrinciplesofAmerican
Federalism and the Nature of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction,
45 EMORY L.J. 1, 55-60 (1996). The Crimes Act also contained
no crimes in which the district courts had jurisdiction. See
HENDERSON, supra note 104, at 7.
141
Minutes for the Circuit Court of the District of
Pennsylvania, M986, "Criminal Case Files of the U.S. Circuit
Court for the Eastern District of PA, 1791-1840" (on file with
the National Archives in Philadelphia) [hereinafter Minutes of
Circuit Court].
142 Id. Maeva Marcus's edited work on the Documentary
History of the Supreme Court includes a summary of every
session held by the circuit courts from 1789 to 1794. In the
early years, it was not uncommon for the sessions to only last
a week or two, if even that long, due to a lack of business. Most
of the cases presented to the circuit courts during this time
were civil cases for which a grand jury was not needed. See
generally MARCUS, supra note 86.
143 HOMER CUMMINGS

& CARL MCFARLAND,

FEDERAL JUSTICE:

CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL

EXECUTIVE 7 (Macmillan Co. 1937) (discussing questions to be
resolved about the administration of criminal justice following
ratification of the Constitution).

[234]
36

Volume 14, Issue 2 (Winter 2020)
"CONSTITUTIONAL INQUISITORS:" THE PRAGMATIC ROOTS
OFFEDERAL PROSECUTORIAL POWER
14 TENN. J.L. & POL'Y 199 (2020)

government exert over cases handled by the district
attorneys? This question arose in different contexts
during the national government's early years. 144 Would
there be a strong, centralized government dictating
policy for the entire nation or would the states, towns,
and plantations have significant local autonomy? During
Washington's first Presidential term, the local district
attorneys exercised unfettered discretion. 14 5 Only rarely
did local district attorneys contact the Administration. 146
In one instance, Pennsylvania's United States Attorney,
William Lewis, wrote to Washington seeking a pardon for
a counterfeiting suspect who offered to inform Lewis
about a larger counterfeiting ring. 147 Determining control
was so significant that, in 1791, Attorney General

Randolph asked Congress to give the Attorney General
supervisory authority over the district attorney's work. 148
144

See WOOD, supra note 123, at 31-33, 53-54 (noting that the

problem of centralization was a key consideration of the
Constitutional Convention and that the subsequent
ratification debates divided the Federalists, who favored
centralization, and the Anti-Federalists, who opposed it).
145 CORNELL CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: ATTORNEY
GENERAL AND THE MAKING OF GOVERNMENT LEGAL POLICY 16

(M.E. Sharpe 1992) (stating there is no connection between the
Attorney General and the United States District Attorneys);
HUSTON, supra note 23, at 6-8.
146 See generally Ingram, supra note
110 (addressing the
relationship between the Administration and its attorneys).
147 Letter from William Lewis to George Washington (Mar. 7,
1791), FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/docu
ments/Washington/05-07-02-0294 [https://perma.cc/FQ26-FVF
H].
148 Letter from the Attorney General to George Washington
(Communicated to Congress) (Dec. 28, 1791), in 1 AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS 45-46 (Library of Congress, American Memory
Series) [hereinafter AMERICAN STATE PAPERS], http://memory

.loc.gov/cgi-
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Failing that, wrote Randolph, "[t]he attorneys of the
districts ought .

.

. to be under an obligation to transmit

to him a state of every case in which the harmony of the
two judiciaries may be hazarded . . . ."149 On routine
matters, district attorneys clearly had autonomy, but did
they have the same autonomy over cases of national
significance? Could the President order the United States
District Attorneys to prosecute? They were Presidential
appointees and represented the United States, yet they
also perceived themselves as judicial officers.15 0 Could
they refuse to comply if they believed the ordered action
was not warranted?
A similar situation existed for the Attorney
General. Randolph attended the Supreme Court's first
session, which lasted one week.15 0 The Court admitted
several attorneys and then adjourned without hearing a
case. 151 That routine continued until August 1791 when
the first case arrived. It was immediately dismissed,
however, because of a procedural error. 152 While the
Attorney General had few cases to argue, Randolph wrote
opinions to department heads as they considered their

&

bin/ampage?collId=llsp&fileName=037/llsp037db&recNum=5
2 [https://perma.cc/387Z-2W4R] (explaining that it is apparent
that the Attorney General did not have control over the District
Attorneys, though it is unclear whether this was intended); see
Bloch, supra note 121, at 567-68. But see CUMMINGS
MCFARLAND, supra note 143, at 11-13.
149 Letter from the Attorney General to George Washington,
supra note 147.

See generally JACOBY, supra note 13; Ingram, supra note
104.
150 REARDON, supra note 130, at 191-92; WARREN, supra note
88, at 46-47 (describing first day of Supreme Court).
151 See WARREN, supra note 88, at 46-51 (describing the term).
152 Id. at 56 (citing West v. Barnes, 2 U.S. 401 (1791)).
150
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constitutional and statutory authority. 151 He soon found
this work consumed substantial time. 152 In the same
letter in which Randolph requested control over the
United States District Attorneys, Randolph requested
funds for a clerk because of the lengthy opinions he had
to write.1 53 Randolph became so engrossed in opinion
writing that his private legal practice suffered. 154 His
only other major assignment as Attorney General
involved reviewing the federal court system. 155

Though not a department head, Randolph
similarly had to determine the scope of his authority.
Without significant statutory guidance, Randolph
adopted a pragmatic

approach. 156 Having served in

politics for much of his adult life, Randolph found himself
mediating
between
Hamilton's
and
Jefferson's

151 Opinions written by the early Attorneys General, including
Randolph's, were not formally preserved. It was not until
William Wirt became the Attorney General under President
Monroe that the Attorneys General began keeping a record of
their opinions. LEONARD DUPEE WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS; A

STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY, 1801-1829 337 (Macmillan

1951) (stating that Attorney General William Wirt was the
first to establish written opinions); CLAYTON, supra, note 145,
at 17-18. Nonetheless, a large number of Randolph's opinions
are now available through the National Archives' Founder's
Online database.
152 Id. at 197-206. A search of the Founder's Online database
yielded at least thirty-seven opinions from February 1790
when Randolph arrived in New York for the Supreme Court's

first term to January 3, 1794 when Randolph took the oath to
become Secretary of States.
153 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 148.

154 REARDON, supra note 130, at 195.
155

Id. at 193-96.

156 See generally Bloch, supra note 121 (arguing that the

relationship between the President and Attorney General was
not clearly defined).
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increasingly hostile positions.157 Replicating the state
Attorney General role, Randolph provided whatever
assistance
the
Administration
required.
These
obligations, coupled with his long-standing relationship
to Washington, 158 pushed the Attorney General away
from judicial duties and toward an executive function. 159
In essence, Randolph became the administration's legal
advisor rather than a neutral judicial officer.16 0
REARDON, supra note 130, at 207, 212-13.
158 Washington and Randolph first worked together during the
Revolutionary War. Id. at 21. Randolph, to prove his loyalty to
the American side, sought and received a position on
Washington's staff. Id. at 19-21. When Randolph's father fled
to Great Britain and his uncle died, Randolph left
Washington's service to take care of the Randolph family
157

affairs. Id. at 22.

159 CLAYTON, supra note 145, at 49-50 (stating that Attorney
General began as a judicial figure and became administrative
later). At this point, Randolph clearly moved beyond his
statutory authority as the Attorney General, which was not on
the same level as the Secretaries of Treasury, War, and State.
Bloch, supra note 121, at 572, 578-79. For Randolph, the
nature of the power exercised was more important than who
exercised it. See generally Scott Ingram, "[Perhaps] the
Principleis Established": The Senate, George Washington, and

KAN. J.L.

&

the Ambiguous Origins of Executive Privilege, 28

PUB. POL'Y 1 (2018).
160 Nancy Baker devised a continuum that assigned Attorneys
General a place between legal (called "neutral") and political in
terms of the relationship with the Presidential administration.
See NANCY V. BAKER,

CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND
POLITICS IN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 35 (Univ. of Kan.

Press 1992). On the political end, the Attorney General is an
advocate for the administration by promoting "both the
president's and his own policy agenda while in office." Id. The
political landscape supersedes the legal landscape. Id. On the
legal side, the Attorney General is independent and answers
only to the rule of law. Id. This type of Attorney General is
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This was the shape of federal criminal justice as
Washington began his second term in March 1793.
Events in Europe forced the federal government to
confront what role its lawyers played in federal criminal
justice.
II. The Neutrality Crisis

As the new American federal government began,
the French citizenry began a revolution, imitating their
American counterparts. 16 1 Americans who initially
observed these events equated the French Revolution
with their own. 162 Over time, the French Revolution's

tenor changed, becoming more radical and bloodier than
the American one.16 3 Nevertheless, most Americans
enthusiastically supported the French Revolution with
parades and festivals, celebrating French victories
including their dethroning King Louis XVI.164 For many
"capable, cautious, thoughtful, legalistic and nonpolitical." Id.
Randolph does not fit neatly along the continuum as he
displayed aspects of each position. However, by the time of the
writing, Randolph was more an advocate than a neutral.
CLAYTON, supra note 145, at 16-17 (Randolph set the
precedent for a close friend of the President serving as Attorney
General). This is not to say that Washington agreed with or
abided by Randolph's legal opinions. See, e.g., Walter Dellinger
& H. Jefferson Powell, The Constitutionalityof the Bank Bill:
The Attorney General's First Constitutional Law Opinion, 44
DUKE L.J. 110, 120 (1994).
161 WOOD, supra note 123, at 174.
162 ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 104,
at 308-09; WOOD,
supra note 123, at 174.
163 JAMES ROGER SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE EARLY

REPUBLIC: THE NEW NATION IN CRISIS 69, 83 (Yale Univ. Press

1993).
164 SIMON P. NEWMAN, PARADES AND THE POLITICS OF THE
STREET: FESTIVE CULTURE IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC
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other Americans, their enthusiasm dampened as
Revolutionary War hero, the Marquis de Lafayette, was
forced to flee France and was captured in Austria. 165 It
turned to

fear when

the new

French

government

guillotined Louis XVI and declared war on Europe. 166
When this news reached the United States,
Washington immediately recognized the threat. 167 The
United States found itself between the warring powers.
Still repaying its Revolutionary War debt, working under

a controversial four-year old federal government, and
lacking a significant military, the United States could not
fight a war, especially one in Europe. 168 While the
139 (Univ. of Pa. Press 1997). These events were partisan in
nature. The Federalists took notice of these events but did not
participate. Id. at 120-22. These events only heightened
Federalist fears that the French Revolution would come to the
United States. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 434
(Penguin Press 2004); ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 104, at

310; WOOD, supranote 123, at 178-79, 183.
165 HARRYAMMON, THE GENET MISSION 41 (WW Norton & Co.,

Inc., 1973); ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 104, at 311;
WOOD, supra note 123, at 177.
166 AMMON, supra note 165, at 42; ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra
note 104, at 311.
167 Letter from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton,
Thomas Jefferson, Henry Knox, and Edmund Randolph (Apr.

18,

1793),

FOUNDERS

ONLINE,

http://founders.archives.gov

/documents/Hamilton/01-14-02-0225-0001 [https://perma.cc/Q
X7R-NVRJ] (Washington calling the cabinet meeting). Eleven
days prior, Washington became satisfied that war had, in fact,
been declared. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George
Washington (Apr. 7, 1793), FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://fou
nders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-12-02-0335

[https://perma.cc/XS99-NJVJ].
168 See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supranote 104, at 334 (discussing
the importance of the Revolutionary War debt owed to France);
CHARLES MARION THOMAS, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY IN 1793: A

STUDY IN CABINET GOVERNMENT 17 (Colum. Univ. Press 1931)
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Administration realized this, not all Americans did.
Many still supported France and believed the United
States owed the French people support just as the French
had supported the Americans Revolution. 169 A smaller
number, who held significant power within Washington's

Administration, relied on commerce with Great Britain
for their livelihood.170 Despite the strong desire to remain
(discussing reasons why war had to be avoided). See generally
RICHARD H. KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD: THE FEDERALISTS AND
THE CREATION OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, 1783-1802
DEBATE THE

CONSTITUTION,

1787-1788

(Simon

&

36-39 (Free Press 1975); PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE
PEOPLE

Schuster 2010) (discussing the controversial nature of the new
national government). For the reasons why war had to be
avoided, see THOMAS supra, at 17 (discussing the United States
military establishment at this time).
169 ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 104, at 308-09; SHARP,
supranote 163, at 81-86 (describing the popular divide and the
different responses to it from the Administration).
170 Jefferson presented his view of the divide in Philadelphia in
a May 13, 1793 letter to James Madison. Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to James Madison (May 13, 1793), FOUNDERS
ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/0126-02-0021 [https://perma.cc/V7KG-AD23]. This was the end of
the same letter in which Jefferson complains about the
neutrality enforcement plans presented by Hamilton and
Randolph. Alexander Hamilton was the driving force of the
pro-British faction within the Administration. On Hamilton's

relationship with Great Britain during this time period, see
GILBERT

L.

LYCAN,

ALEXANDER

HAMILTON,

&

AMERICAN

FOREIGN POLICY: A DESIGN FOR GREATNESS 148 (Univ. of Okla.

Press 1970). On the influence Hamilton had over Washington
and Jefferson's response to it, see AMMON, supra note 165, at
4; CHERNOW, supranote 164, at 440 (Jefferson informing Genet
of the influence held by Hamilton and U.S. Senator Robert
Morris as English supporters); JOHN FERLING, JEFFERSON AND
HAMILTON:

THE

RIVALRY THAT FORGED A NATION 213-23

(Bloomsbury Press 2013).
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out of war, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with
France, signed during the American Revolution, required
the United States to aid France if France was attacked. 171

It was possible that the French would invoke this
provision. 172 This situation forced the Administration to
find a neutral path.
A. First Cabinet Meetings

Upon learning of the war, Washington called a
cabinet meeting to ask nine questions relating to the
United States' response. 173 The first question posited
whether the government should accept the new French
Minister to the United States, Edmond Charles Genet. 174
Hamilton argued the government should not accept him
because withholding recognition was a prerequisite for
the United States to be able to assert that the Treaty of
Amity and Commerce between the United States and
France was no longer valid due to the lack of a stable
171

WILLIAM

R.

CASTO,

FOREIGN

AFFAIRS

AND

THE

CONSTITUTION IN THE AGE OF FIGHTING SAIL 20-21 (Univ. of

S.C. Press 2006) (while this was a treaty term, the French had
allegedly waived the provision).
172 AMMON, supranote 165, at 25-27 (describing French consul
Edmond Genet's instructions for his mission to the United
States).
173 CASTO, supra note 171, at 29-30. These questions set the
stage for Cabinet dissension. Hamilton met with Washington
prior to the meeting and presented the questions to
Washington. Id. at 29. Also prior to the meeting, Randolph
wrote the questions and distributed them Id. This likely
irritated Jefferson as he recognized Hamilton's work based on
the tenor of the questions. Id.; see Minutes of a Cabinet
Meeting, FOUNDERS ONLINE (Apr. 19, 1793), http://found
ers.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-12-02-0362 [https:
//perma.cc/W8FE-Q5AP] for a short summary of the meeting.
174 CASTO, supra note 171, at 26-27.
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French government. 175 Jefferson countered that the
United States should recognize Genet because the United
States was bound by the treaty's terms as treaties bound
nations, not governments. 176 Jefferson's position
prevailed with Randolph's support. 177
With the first question decided, the meeting
turned to the United States' position vis-a-vis the
warring powers. All agreed that the United States should
remain neutral, but Hamilton and Jefferson contested
the details. 178 Hamilton believed Washington should
issue a statement proclaiming neutrality. 179 Prior to the
meeting, United States Supreme Court Chief Justice
John Jay provided Hamilton a proposed proclamation.1 8 0
Hamilton, in turn, presented it to the Cabinet. 181
Jefferson opposed the proclamation. 182 He believed that
the United States should seek concessions from the
warring powers prior to

declaring neutrality. 183 He

175 Id.; LYCAN, supra note 170, at 153-55.
176 ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 104, at 339.

177 Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (May
6,

1793),

FOUNDERS ONLINE,

https://founders.archives.gov/

documents/Washington/05-12-02-0429 [https://perma.cc/V5DG
-3NVW].
178 AMMON, supra note 165, at 48; CASTO, supra note 171, at

26-27 (noting that "neutrality was not a clear and precisely
developed concept"); ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 104, at

337; FERLING, supra note 170, at 246. This left the Washington
Administration a full cloth with which to work when crafting

their version of neutrality. As made clear below, Jefferson
favored a neutrality that benefitted France. Hamilton sought a
strict neutrality that denied France any ally benefits from the
United States. CASTO, supra note 171, at 24-25.
179 AMMON, supra note 165, at 48-50.
180 CASTO, supra note 171, at 28.
181

Id. at 29-30.

182 ELKINS & MCKITTRICK, supra note 104, at 337.
183 Id.; LYCAN, supra note 170, at 160.

[243]
45

Tennessee Journalof Law and Policy, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 1
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OFLAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 14 1 WINTER 2020 1 ISSUE 2

thought that this might help the United States' standing
vis-a-vis the other European nations, particularly in
terms of opening their ports to United States
commerce. 184 When this approach failed, Jefferson
argued Washington lacked the constitutional authority to
declare neutrality because Congress had the power to
declare war so Congress, alone, possessed the power to
declare peace. 185 Hamilton countered that a neutrality
proclamation did not announce a new policy but merely
affirmed the status quo. 186 After some deliberation,
Hamilton's position prevailed, with Randolph supporting
the proclamation. 187

Having decided to issue a statement announcing
neutrality, Washington directed Randolph to write the
proposed
proclamation
draft. 188
Randolph's
demonstrated his preference for practicality over
ideology. Likely influenced by Jay's draft, Randolph
devised a similar proclamation but wrote it such that the
Cabinet could unanimously support it.189 Randolph's
proclamation contained two notable features. First, it

184

FERLING, supra note 170, at 252-53 (using as evidence

Jefferson's report in Fall 1793 about the necessity of America
freeing itself from reliance on British commerce); ROBERT
TUCKER & DAVID HENDRICKSON,

EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: THE

STATECRAFT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 56 (Oxford Univ. Press

1992).
185 It is important to note that Jefferson did not oppose
neutralitybut opposed the public declaration of it. U.S. CONST.,
art. I, § 8 (Congress has the power to declare war); AMMON,
supra note 165, at 48.
186 THOMAS, supra note 168, at 39.
187 For a discussion of the debate, see THOMAS, supranote 168,
at 40-41.
188 REARDON, supra note 130, at 222.
189 Id. at 224; CASTO, supra note 171, at 31.
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omitted the word "neutrality."1 9 0 Realizing that Jefferson
adamantly denied the President's power to declare
neutrality, Randolph wrote that the United States would
"adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial
toward the belligerent powers." 191 While the omission of
"neutrality" was significant, Randolph's final paragraph
had more significant domestic consequences. He warned
the citizenry that any conduct not "friendly and
impartial" would result in criminal prosecution. 192 This
included "committing, aiding or abetting hostilities
against any of the said powers, or by carrying to any of

them those articles, which are deemed contraband by the
modern usage of nations."19 3 Tying violations to the Law
190 See George Washington, Neutrality Proclamation,22 April
1793, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/docum

ents/Washington/05-12-02-0371 [https://perma.cc/MAQ5-ME2
A].
191 Id. Interestingly, Jefferson may have won this small battle
but his victory likely cost him the larger political war over
neutrality policy. Rather than use the term "neutrality,"
Randolph used "impartial."
Jefferson did not want an
impartial neutrality; however, once used in the proclamation,
impartiality became the policy. THOMAS, supra note 168, at 21.
192 Neutrality Proclamation, 22 April 1793, supra note 190.

This was not the first time Washington used a proclamation to
warn of criminal prosecution if the citizenry did not comply.
See

Proclamation, 19 March 1791,

FOUNDER'S ONLINE,

https://founders. archives. gov/documents/Washington/05-0702-0343 [https://perma.cc/824X-NAXP].
193 Neutrality Proclamation, 22 April 1793, supra note 190.

There is some question about whether Randolph inserted this
paragraph on his own or if he relied upon a similar provision
in Supreme Court Chief Justice John Jay's draft proclamation.
Compare CASTO, supra note 171, at 28, with REARDON, supra

note 130, at 221-23 (lacking any discussion of reliance on Chief
Justice John Jay's draft proclamation). Jay's draft was longer
than the final draft approved by Washington. CASTO, supra
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of Nations provided the constitutional basis for federal
criminal prosecution. 194 The federal government had
clear authority over international affairs 195 and,
therefore, had power to enforce the law of nations. 196
After
receiving
unanimous
Cabinet
approval,
Washington issued what became known as the
"Neutrality Proclamation" on April 22.197

While Washington likely favored Hamilton's
ideological position, Washington's desire to proclaim
neutrality also resulted from practical reality. Writing to
Hamilton about the European war prior to the April 19
meeting, Washington expressed his concern about
American citizens involving themselves in the war.
Hostilities
having
commenced
between France and England, it is
incumbent upon the Government of the
United States to prevent, as far as in it lies,
all interferences of our citizens in them;
and immediate precautionary measures
note 171,
friend of
succeeded
document

at 31. If it, in fact, came from Jay, who was a close
Hamilton's, it is further evidence that Jefferson
only in removing the term "neutrality" from the
and, ultimately, lost the political struggle over

neutrality policy. Id.
194 Preyer, supra note 137, at 232.

195 See U.S. Const. art. I,
art. II,

§ 8; U.S. Const. art. I, § 10; U.S. Const.

§ 2; Casto, supra note 70.

See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal
Common Law of Nations, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2-7 (2009)
(outlining competing views on the application of the law of
nations and identifying an alternate view based on the nation's
founders' practices); Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of
Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 820-21
(1989).
197 For one theory about how it became known as the
"Neutrality Proclamation" without using the word "neutrality"
see THOMAS, supra note 168, at 48.
196
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ought...to be taken...as I have reason to
believe...that many vessels in different
parts of the Union are designated for
Privateers & are preparing accordingly.

The means to prevent it, and for the United
States to maintain a strict neutrality
between the powers at war, I wish to have
seriously thought of... 198
Washington suspected American citizens were
arming themselves to fight for the French. 199 He knew
this could draw the United States into the war. 200
The threat was greater than Washington knew.
In February, even before word of the European war

198 Letter from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton
(April 12, 1793), FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.
gov/documents/Hamilton/01-14-02-0207 [https://perma.cc/6TH
Y-RFK3].
199 Letter from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton
(April 12, 1793), FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.
gov/documents/Washington/05-12-02-0352 [https://perma.cc/S
V9J-WU5X]. On the same day, Washington wrote letters to
Jefferson and Secretary of War Henry Knox. His message to
Jefferson was similar to Hamilton's. Letter from George
Washington to Thomas Jefferson (April 12, 1793), FOUNDERS
ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/
05-12-02-0353 [https://perma.cc/5CJQ-LP25]. He did not
mention neutrality in the letter to Knox. Letter from George
Washington

to Henry

Knox

(April 12,

1973),

FOUNDERS

ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/
05-12-02-0354 [https://perma.cc/E6HP-FFRP].
200 Scott Ingram, Replacing the "Sword of War" with the "Scales
of Justice": Henfield's Case and the Origins of Lawfare in the
United States, 9 J. NATI'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 483, 489-90
(2018).
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reached the United States, Genet set sail from France. 20 1
Rather than arrive at Philadelphia, the nation's capital,
Genet landed at Charleston, South Carolina on April 8.202
Following an enthusiastic welcome from Charleston's
French supporters, Genet met with South Carolina's
governor, William Moultrie, about commissioning
privateers. 20 3 Moultrie listened to Genet and permitted
him to outfit and commission privateers because
Moultrie knew of no legal prohibition. 20 4 With Moultrie's
201

AMMON, supra note 165, at 31; CASTO, supra note 171, at 1.

For a detailed background on Genet, see AMMON, supra note
165, at 1-18. For a shorter explanation of Genet's relationship
with French government, see ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supranote

104, at 330-32.
202 Why Genet landed at Charleston is a historical mystery.
Genet claimed the captain had to sail south to avoid British
navy vessels. LYCAN, supra note 170, at 146. Historians
question his assertion. He may have gone there because he
knew he would receive a favorable reception from the people.
WOOD, supra note 123, at 185-86 (discussing the "warmth and
enthusiasm" with which he was greeted. Id. at 185). It is also
possible that he chose Charleston because his instructions
involved, in part, establishing forces to occupy land south and
west of the United States. AMMON, supra note 165, at 25-27.
Regardless of the reason for his arrival at Charleston, arriving
there and taking a long journey to Philadelphia cost Genet the
opportunity to influence the initial framing of United States
neutrality policy and arrived in Philadelphia not familiar with
Washington's Neutrality Proclamation. AMMON, supra note
165, at 44; CASTO, supranote 171, at 35.
203 CASTO, supra note 171, at 35. On the effect this had on
Genet, see AMMON, supra note 165, at 45.
204 This conversation occurred not only before Moultrie learned
of Washington's proclamation but before Washington even
issued the proclamation. C.L. BRAGG, CRESCENT MOON OVER

256
(2013); CASTO, supra note 171, at 45-47; ELKINS & MCKITRICK,
supra note 104, at 335.
CAROLINA: WILLIAM MOULTRIE AND AMERICAN LIBERTY
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blessing and no contrary statement from the federal
government,

Genet began recruiting. 20 5

Privateering

required a significant investment to outfit merchant
ships with armaments and double the crew size because,
for each prize taken, the privateer had to send a crew to
sail the seized vessel. 206 Genet found many candidates.
Charleston was the largest port in the south and had
many

French

supporters. 20

7

It also

teemed

with

merchants willing to forgo trade for the allure of
capturing prizes.20 8 Within ten days, Genet had his first
two privateers manned and sent to sea. The Citizen
205 CASTO, supra note 171, at 45-49.

Privateers were private

vessels commissioned by warring nations to attack and capture
enemy vessels. Id. at 44. Generally, these privateers preyed on
commercial shipping. Id. at 43. There was a thin line between
privateering and piracy. Warring powers granted privateers a

letter of marque. This letter recognized the official nature of
the privateer. Id. at 44. Without such a letter, the attacking
vessel would be considered a pirate. Id. at 45. Once a vessel
was seized, the seizing vessel had to take the seized vessel to a
port where an admiralty court would determine whether the
seizure was lawful. Id. at 37-38. If the court so decided, the
seizing vessel could sell the seized vessel and share the
proceeds with the nation granting the letter of marque. The
first seizures by the French in America during 1793 were
condemned by the courts Genet established and then sold back
to the British owners. CASTO, supra note 171, at 39. Genet
intended to use these proceeds to fund other aspects of his
mission. Id; see also BRAGG, supranote 204, at 256-58.
206 CASTO, supra note 171, at 43-44.
207 ROBERT J. ALDERSON, JR., THE BRIGHT ERA OF HAPPY
MICHEL-ANGE-BERNARD
FRENCH
CONSUL
REVOLUTIONS:
MANGOURIT
AND
INTERNATIONAL
REPUBLICANISM
IN

CHARLESTON, 1792-1794, 40-53 (2008); BRAGG, supranote 204,

at 255-57; CASTO, supranote 171, at 46-47.
208 MELVIN H. JACKSON, PRIVATEERS IN CHARLESTON,

1793-

1796, vi (1969).
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Genet left on April 18 and Le Sans Culotte left soon
after. 209 They joined Genet's vessel, Le Embuscade, on a
journey north, seeking British commercial vessels. 2 10
Reports quickly reached Philadelphia that French
privateers were seizing British vessels along the United
States' Atlantic coast. 21 1 The French sent the vessels to
nearby American ports for condemnation. 212 To re-sell a
captured vessel, a court had to review the seizure to
ensure its legality. 2 13 Usually the seizing nation sent the
captured vessel to the seizing nation's closest port. 214
Along the Atlantic coast, this posed a problem for France
because captured vessels had to go to the French West
Indies or across the Atlantic to France. 2 15 Both options
left French prizes vulnerable to recapture. 216 To solve
this, Genet established consular courts in the United
States. 217 France's consuls to the United States served as
admiralty courts, quickly ruling seizures legal while
ignoring
the
infringement
on
United
States
sovereignty. 218 These seizures became fodder for British
complaints to the United States government. 2 19

CASTO, supra note 171, at 47-48.
Id. at 47-48.
211 See Memorial from George Hammond, 2 May 1793,
209

210

FOUNDERS

ONLINE,

http://founders.archives.gov/documents/

Jefferson/01-25-02-0584 [https://perma.cc/QWG5-AS94].
212 CASTO, supra note 171, at 39.
213 Id. at 38.
214 Id
215 Id
216

Id

217 Id. at 39.
218 Id. at 49.
219 ALDERSON,

supra note 207, at 63-65; BRAGG, supra note

204, at 257-58.
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B. Proposed

Instructions for the

Customs

Collectors
To

address

French

privateering

activity,

Alexander Hamilton drafted a circular letter for the
Customs Collector at each United States port. 220 The
letter instructed them on neutrality enforcement. 22 1 On
May 4, 1793, Hamilton sent his draft to Washington. 222
Two days later, Washington consulted Jefferson about
Hamilton's instructions. 223
According to Jefferson,
220 The draft Hamilton showed Washington, and later, the
Administration, no longer exists.
Letter from Alexander
Hamilton to George Washington, supra note 1. The editors of
Hamilton's papers argue that the final version Hamilton sent
in August reflects his original other than the changes that are
the subject of this article. Id. While this may be the case, I
would suggest that the events that occurred between the first
draft and the final draft caused multiple alterations. For
example, the week before Hamilton sent the rules to the
Collectors, Randolph presented proposed rules for arming
privateers, the Cabinet discussed them and Randolph and
Hamilton co-wrote rules for arming privateers which
eventually went to the Collectors.
See Proposed Rules
ConcerningArming and Equipping of Vessels By Belligerents
in the Portsof the United States, First Version, 29-30 July 1793,
FOUNDER'S ONLINE,

https://founders.archives.gov/documents/

Hamilton/01-15-02-0116-0001 [https://perma.cc/TF27-VSH4];
ProposedRules ConcerningArming and Equipping of Vessels
by Belligerents in the Ports of the United States, Second
Version, 29-30 July 1793, FOUNDER'S ONLINE, https://
founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-15-02-0116-00
02 [https://perma.cc/GFZ8-Z7MH].
221 Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington,
supra note 1.
222

Id.

223 Notes on Alexander Hamilton and the Enforcement of
Neutrality, 6 May 1793, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.ar
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Hamilton wanted the Collectors "to superintend their
neighborhood, watch for all acts of our citizens contrary
to laws of neutrality or tending to infringe those laws,
and inform [Hamilton] of it...."224 This proposal triggered
discussion about the constitutionality and the
practicalities of federal law enforcement. 225 These
discussions led to a policy choice that established federal
prosecutors as the nation's constitutional inquisitors. 226

After learning about Hamilton's proposal,
Jefferson responded in three parts. First, Jefferson
voiced his objection while meeting with Randolph and
Hamilton. 227 Following that meeting, Jefferson expanded
on his objections in a letter to Randolph. 228 Five days
later, after receiving Randolph's response, Jefferson sent
a letter to Congressman and confidante James Madison
restating Jefferson's arguments.229 Despite Jefferson's
objections, the Administration ultimately instructed the
United States District Attorneys to prosecute neutrality
violations based on information obtained from Customs
Collectors.230
chives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-25-02-0608
cc/JX2Z-VBGW].

[https://perma.

224 Id

225 Id.; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph,
supra note 1.

226 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph, supra
note 1.

227 Editorial Notes, Notes on Alexander Hamilton and the
Enforcement of Neutrality, 6 May 1793, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
https://founders. archives. gov/documents/Jefferson/01-25-020608 [https://perma.cc/Q4BK-JBZ5].
228 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph, supra
note 1.
229

Id.

PUBLIC LIBRARY DIGITAL
ARCHIVES DIVISION, THE

COLLECTIONS,
NEW

YORK

MANUSCRIPTS
PUBLIC

&

230 Letter to William Channing [Newport, R.I.], NEW YORK
LIBRARY,
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Little detail remains from the May 7th meeting
between Jefferson, Hamilton and Randolph. The three
discussed Hamilton's proposal and Jefferson voiced his
opposition. In the first paragraph of Jefferson's May 8
letter to Randolph, Jefferson stated that although the
whole of the proposal was "disagreeable" to him, the last
section, regarding the surveillance of shipbuilding to
discover ships built for France, was his initial
objection. 2 31 This indicates that the May 7 meeting may

have focused more on domestic shipbuilding practices
and their relation to neutrality enforcement than cases

http://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/bac0a75c-2673-b981e040-e00a18067fd9 [https://perma.cc/T6M2-RBQY] (this is the
letter sent to the United States District Attorney for Rhode
Island, William Channing. This is almost certainly a circular
letter Randolph sent to the United States District Attorneys.
The text has no personal references and does not make any
allusions to specific jurisdictions); Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 170 (Jefferson also
references in his letter to Madison that Randolph was to send
instructions to the prosecutors); see also Letter from Edmund
Randolph to William Rawle (May 12, 1793), in RAWLE FAMILY
PAPERS (on file with the Pennsylvania Historical Society) (the
Rawle Family papers, which includes the papers of United
States District Attorney William Rawle, also contain a copy of
this letter).
231 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph, supra
note 1; see also Letter from George Washington to Alexander
Hamilton from George Washington (May 7, 1793), FOUNDERS

ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/0114-02-0283 (Washington's other concern about neutrality was
the effect it would have on American ship building activities.
In a letter to Hamilton, Washington voices this concern. As a
result, it was likely on Jefferson's mind as he devised his
arguments about enforcement).
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where Americans served on French vessels. 232
Randolph's May 9th response furnishes another clue
about Jefferson's objections. 233 In response to Jefferson's
fear that the Customs Collectors would become spies,
Randolph reminded Jefferson "...that I was on the point
as deserving
of making Your very objection,
consideration, when you mentioned it." 234 Otherwise, the
only other certainty from the meeting was that Jefferson
felt compelled to write Randolph, expanding upon his
objections and asking Randolph to communicate
Jefferson's objections to Washington should Randolph
have the opportunity. 235

Jefferson's May 8 letter to Randolph provides the
most complete record of Jefferson's objections. He first
objected to using Customs Collectors for investigatory
purposes. 236 Jefferson believed having them watch other
citizens and report on citizen activity made the Customs
Collectors spies. 2 37 Jefferson argued they "are to be made

232

Letter from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton,

supra note 231; see JOSEPH ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE
CHARACTER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 28, 39, 44 (1996) (it is also

likely that Jefferson had not thought of his ideas until after the
meeting. Jefferson was not noted for his oral debate skills and
despised committee bickering); FERLING, supra note 170, at 19.

233 See Letter from Edmund Randolph to Thomas Jefferson,
supra note 2.
234 Id

See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph,
supra note 1. Jefferson likely inserted this because Jefferson
knew that his policy arguments, especially when they opposed
Hamilton's, were not likely to be well-received by Washington.
Jefferson had worn out Washington with his complaints about
Hamilton during the latter half of 1792. FERLING, supra note
170, at 239.
236 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph, supra
235

note 1.
237

Id.
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an established corps of spies or informers against their
fellow citizens, whose actions they are to watch in secret,
inform against in secret to the Secretary of the Treasury,
who is to communicate to the President."238 At that point
the Administration would review the evidence and
commence a criminal prosecution. 239 If there is not
sufficient evidence, according to Jefferson, "then the only
consequence is that the mind of the government has been
poisoned against a citizen, neither knowing nor
suspecting it, and perhaps too distant to bring forward
his justification."240 This comment echoes of the fears
expressed by many regarding the establishment of
federal courts. Jefferson then took his argument one step
further asserting, "This will at least furnish the collector
with a convenient weapon to keep down a rival, draw a
cloud over an inconvenient censor, or satisfy mere malice
and private enmity."241 This argument anticipated law
enforcement usurping national authority for personal
gain.

Next Jefferson turned to which government
department had law enforcement responsibility.
Hamilton's proposal, according to Jefferson, moved
responsibility from either the Secretary of War or State
to Treasury.242 Jefferson wrote, "Acts involving war, or
proceedings which respect foreign nations, seem to
belong either to the department of war, or to that which

238

Id.

Id.
240 Id. This threat may be overstated. It does not seem likely
the government's mind would be poisoned or that the person
would need a defense if the government itself determined the
evidence was not sufficient.
241 Id
242 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph, supra
239

note 1.
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is charged with the affairs of foreign nations." 243 After
expressing his belief that Treasury only had
responsibility for revenue, Jefferson stated his most
serious objection, asserting Hamilton's plan was "...to
add a new and large feild [sic] to a department already
amply provided with business, patronage,
and
influence." 244 Apparently Jefferson voiced this objection
at the meeting with Hamilton and Randolph and one of
them, or both, responded that the Customs Collectors are
in a prime position to observe violations. 245 To this
Jefferson returned to shipbuilding. He wrote, "[the
Customs Collectors] are in convenient positions too for
building ships of war: but will that business be
transplanted from [its] department, merely because it
can be conveniently done in another?"24 6
Jefferson then proposed an alternative. He first
distinguished between foreigners and American citizens.
Foreigners should be turned over to the military while
citizens may be proceeded against through the courts. 24 7
243

Id.

244 Id
245

Id.

246

Id.

Id. Jefferson leaves us to speculate about what would
happen to foreigners after they were turned over to the
military. In some respects, the question was answered during
the fall of 1793 when United States District Attorney
Christopher Gore attempted to prosecute a French consul and
chancellor for arming privateers in Boston. The case led was
eventually dismissed by the direction of Randolph, as
Secretary of State. See United States v. Jutau (Mass. Cir. Ct.
June 11, 1793) (on file with the National Archives in Boston);
Letter from Christopher Gore to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 10,
247

1793),

FOUNDERS

ONLINE,

https://founders.archives.gov/doc

uments/Jefferson/01-27-02-0075
[https://perma.cc/9PY5-LS6
L]. The answer to this question lingers today in the guise of
what to do about foreign terrorists seeking to attack the United
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To Jefferson, the constitutional method to investigate
citizens was the grand jury. He wrote, "Grandjurors are
the constitutional inquisitors and informers of the
country, they are scattered every where, see every thing,

see it while they suppose themselves mere private
persons, and not with the prejudiced eye of a permanent
and systematic spy."248 Using grand jurors protected

citizens from false allegations: First, their information
was on oath, thus making it more trustworthy and free of
personal gain. 249 Second, it was public so that the accused
person could respond. 250 Third, the grand jurors were
local. 251 Jefferson believed this meant that false
allegations
could be refuted immediately
and
252
effectively.
Fourth, the potential for abuse, inherent
with the Customs Collectors, would not arise with grand
jurors.253 Grand jurors were respected community
States. See, e.g., Robert Chesney et al., Back to the Future on
Detention and Military Commissions, LAWFARE (Nov. 2, 2017),

https://www.lawfareblog.com/back-future-detention-and-mili
tary-commissions [https://perma.cc/9S33-5QGU] (discussing
the debate about sending Sayfullo Saipov, who ran a truck into
pedestrians on a New York City walkway, to Guantanamo Bay
as an enemy combatant).
248 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph, supra
note 1.
249 Id.

&

250 Id. Today, there is a certain irony to this argument in favor
of grand juries because the grand jury is one of the most
secretive aspects of our government. See Sara Sun Beale
James E. Felman, The Consequence of Enlisting Federal Grand
Juries in the War on Terrorism: Assessing the USA Patriot Act's
Changes to Grand Jury Secrecy, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y

699, 699-707 (2001).

251 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph, supra
note 1.
252 Id.

253

Id.
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.

members and their time as grand jurors was short
compared to the Customs collector's unlimited tenure. 254
Jefferson also argued that the law would be better
enforced through judicial oversight. He predicted the
following chain of events:
"The Judges having notice of the
[neutrality] proclamation, will perceive
that the occurrence of a foreign war has
brought into activity the laws of neutrality,
as a part of the law of the land. This new
branch of the law they will know needs
explanation to the grand jurors more than
any other. They will study and define the
subject to them and to the public. The
public mind will by this be warned against
the acts which may endanger our peace .
"

255

According to Jefferson, these events would occur
by simply suggesting it to the judges. 256 Jefferson also

perceived a foreign affairs benefit to his policy when he
wrote, "foreign nations will see a much more respectable
evidence of our bona fide intentions to preserve
neutrality."

257

Id
255 Id. This would be a very slow process. Of course, this also
served Jefferson's foreign policy interests. If neutrality
enforcement took time, the French could take advantage of the
delays by seizing British ships with delayed impunity. On the
speed of French consular courts in the United States, see
CASTO, supranote 171, at 36-39.
256 Id. In fact, this happened as Chief Justice Jay and Justice
254

Wilson quickly gave grand jury charges explaining the topic.

Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1099-109 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793)
(No. 6,360) (reprinting the charges from both Justices).
257 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph, supra
note 1.
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Finally, Jefferson listed two problems caused by
Hamilton's proposal: First, society will be poisoned by the
nature
of
secret
accusations. 258
Second,
the
Administration will be discredited for planting "a germ of
private inquisition absolutely unknown to our laws." 259
With this, Jefferson concluded his policy objections and
proposals by stating he was uncertain about the outcome
of the previous day's meeting but that it was not too late
to change course. 260

Randolph received Jefferson's objections the next
day and responded immediately. 26 1 He informed
Jefferson that Randolph asked Hamilton about
Jefferson's concern regarding the Customs Collectors
being trained as spies. 262 Randolph knew of past
allegations of Customs Collectors prying into individual
conduct. 26 3 Asking Hamilton, Randolph learned that
Hamilton had never directed such conduct. 264 Hamilton
showed his letter-books to Randolph as proof that no such
directive was sent. 265 With his mind at ease over this
matter, Randolph explained his support for Hamilton's
proposal and presented his own modification. 266
The attorney general first addressed Jefferson's
objection to using the Customs Collectors. Randolph did
258
259

Id.
Id.

260

Id.

261 Letter from Edmund Randolph to Thomas Jefferson, supra
note 2.
262
263

Id.
Id.

264 Id

265 Id. While Hamilton apparently did not send any such
directive, the absence of the directive does not mean that the
Customs Collectors did not engage in such conduct on their
own initiative.
266

Id.
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not perceive that they would be spies, but merely observe
conduct in the course of their ordinary duties. 267 His
reasoning began with the fact that Customs Collectors
were executive officials; they were federal government
employees.

268

To Randolph, it seemed reasonable for

them to perform not only their jobs, but to provide
general intelligence for the executive government. 269 He
even suggested that their failure to provide such
information was negligent, writing, "A refusal might not

be the ground of an impeachment; but under the strictest
constitution it would be deemed an indecorum, unless
public duties absorbed too much of their time." 270 Not
only should the collectors provide this information, but
according to Randolph, they were duty-bound to enforce
neutrality.271

Randolph argued Customs Collectors were
essential to effective neutrality enforcement. 272 The
United States government had to prove their neutrality
to the world, especially considering "the preponderance
of affection in the people towards the French.... "273 To
Randolph, identifying suspicious activity and violators
supplied the best proof. The collectors were in the best
position to identify this activity: "the collectors are, for
their position near the water, the scene of those
violations, best qualified to assist congress." 274 They were

267

Id.

268

Id.

269
270

Id.

Id.

271 Id.
272 Id.

273

Id.

274

Id.
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loyal to the federal government. 275 The same could not be
said of all the citizenry. 276

Having established the Collectors' importance,
Randolph presented his modification to Hamilton's plan.
Rather than have the Collectors report to Hamilton,
Randolph proposed that collectors report unlawful
activity to the United States District Attorneys. 277 He
likened the collectors to ordinary citizens. "Itis the right,
nay duty of every citizen to enforce the laws. This has
been the constant opinion of governments in most
proclamations, which call upon the officers at large to
cooperate in bringing offenders to justice."278 Randolph
also suggested only instructing the Customs Collectors at
sea ports to report violations because informing "excise
officers on the top of the Allegany" was useless. To
Randolph, this limited the potential for corruption.279
Randolph concluded by responding directly to
Jefferson's arguments. Jefferson, per Randolph's
interpretation, objected to employing alternative means

to initiate a criminal case. 280 Randolph stated that the
instructions merely provided a stimulus for the collector
to do something which the collector, as a citizen, could do
on his own, namely report a violation of law. 281 Once the
attorney had the case, according to Randolph, the
prosecution process would be no different from any other
275

GAUTHAM RAO, NATIONAL DUTIES: CUSTOM HOUSES AND THE

MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE 69-72 (University of Chicago

Press) (2016).
276 Letter from Edmund Randolph to Thomas Jefferson, supra
note 2.
277

Id.

278 Id.
279 Id.
280 Id.

281 Id. This parallels the private/public prosecutor distinction
and the morals offense versus victim offense distinction.
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case. 282 Randolph insisted that Hamilton would not
receive the information directly and reminded Jefferson
that Hamilton already agreed to Randolph's modification
during their meeting. 28 3 Finally, Randolph addressed
Jefferson's separation of duty argument. He observed
Jefferson barely raised the argument at the meeting
stating, "The impropriety... was so slightly hinted by you

during the consultation, that it did not pass thro' any
discussion in my mind."284 Acknowledging that the
Secretary of State was the person who had the designated
domestic authority, Randolph explained that the lines
between departmental duties is not always clearly
delineated.285 He suggested that the President has the
authority to "instruct, whom he pleases." 286 This shows
Randolph as pragmatic rather than dogmatic.
Jefferson received Randolph's reply on May 10.287
Three days later Jefferson was still upset with
Randolph's response. Jefferson wrote to James Madison,
describing the situation. Between Randolph's letter and
the letter to Madison, the cabinet met to discuss the issue
and settled on Randolph's modification. 288 While
Randolph's modification was likely more palatable to
Jefferson than Hamilton's, Jefferson's letter to Madison
clearly
expressed
Jefferson's
distaste
for
the
resolution. 289

282 Letter from Edmund Randolph to Thomas Jefferson, supra
note 2.
284

Id.
Id.

285

Id.

283

286

Id.
287 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note
170; see also Editors Notes, in Letter from Edmund Randoph
to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 2.
288
289

Id.
Id.
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Jefferson complained how "Anglophobia has
seised violently on three members of our council." 290
Considering only four served on the council, it appears
Jefferson alone escaped it. The Anglophobia revealed
itself whenever neutrality was discussed. 29 1 Jefferson
then described Hamilton's proposal, emphasizing that
Hamilton's plan made Hamilton the recipient of
information about alleged violations. 292 Then he listed his
three main points: (1) Hamilton's proposal established "a
system of espionage" that would be "destructive of the
peace of society;" (2) the proposal gave the Treasury

Department too much power; and (3) that using the
judges to instruct grand jurors, "the constitutional and
public informers," would allow those accused to respond
and justify their actions. 293 Jefferson's third point relied
upon the speed with which federal courts processed cases.
A circuit court session lasted two weeks, at most. 294
Criminal trials took place as early as two days after a
grand jury returned the indictment.295

After giving Madison the options, Jefferson
discussed Randolph's resolution. Jefferson wrote, "E.R.
found a hair to split, which, as always happens, became
the decision." 296 Hamilton was to instruct the Customs
Collectors to convey any information regarding violations
to the local United States District Attorney. 297 Randolph
would instruct the district attorneys and inform them

Id.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 See generally MARCUS, supra note 86.
295 See e.g., Ingram, supra note 200, at 501.
296 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note
170.
290

297 Id.
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that they should proceed by indictment. 298 In Jefferson's
mind, resolving neutrality questions hinged on
Randolph's opinion. 299 Hamilton and Secretary of War
Henry Knox generally voted together. Jefferson opposed.
If Randolph agreed with Jefferson the vote was two to
two.300 However, if Randolph opposed Jefferson,
Hamilton had his majority vote.30 1 Jefferson described

Randolph as "the most indecisive one I ever had to do
business with. He always contrives to agree in principle
with one, but in conclusion with the other."3 0 2 Jefferson
concluded his critique stating that Randolph's decisions
were "unjustifiable in principle, in interest, and in
respect to the wishes of our constituents."3 0 3

The letter to Madison concludes with observations
about the Administration's neutrality policy. From
Jefferson's perspective, only the President's inclinations
and public opinion prevented an "English neutrality." 304

&

He also described Philadelphia's partisan divide. "[T]he
fashionable circles of Phila., N. York, Boston
Charleston" combined with business speculators, and
merchants who traded with the British were British
supporters.3 0 5

Those

remaining-independent

merchants, farmers, and mechanics-supported the
French.30 6 This indicates Jefferson's objections were more
factional than ideological.
298

Id.

299 Id.

300 ALEXANDER DECONDE, ENTANGLING ALLIANCE: POLITICS
AND DIPLOMACY UNDER GEORGE WASHINGTON 209-10 (Duke

Univ. Press 1958).
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 Id

305 Id.
306 Id. Through their correspondence, Jefferson and Madison
labeled various groups. ELKINS & MCKITTRICK, supranote 104,
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Intervening events ended the debate and forced
the administration to act. As Jefferson voiced his
objections, Genet's privateers captured several British
vessels with the news spreading through the seaports.3 0 7
Customs collectors and conscientious citizens reported
that Le Sans Culotte seized a British vessel, the Eagle.30 8
British Minister George Hammond petitioned the United
States Government complaining that American citizens
participated in the seizure.3 09 He followed his first
petition

with

another,

reporting

that

additional

Americans served on The Citizen Genet when it captured
the William near the mouth of the Chesapeake.3 1 0
Washington held a Cabinet meeting to decide on a
response. Discussions turned to Randolph's modification
of Hamilton's plan and led to a vote. Hamilton and
at 237. "Speculators" and "Tories" were "opponents on domestic

and foreign matters." Id. "Aristocrats" were people of money
rather than property. Id. "Monarchists" were "those who
favored the English monarchy rather than French." Id.
Jefferson also began identifying diverse interests, particularly
agricultural and stock jobbers. Id.
307 CASTO, supra note 171, at 48-50.
308 Letter from Thomas Newton Jr. & William Lindsay to
George Washington (May 5, 1793), FOUNDERS ONLINE,

http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-12-02-

0423 [https://perma.cc/2QQ2-SM76]. In this letter, dated two
days after the Citizen Genet seized the William, neither
Lindsay nor Newton referenced the Citizen Genet. Id. Instead,
they informed about other privateers, Le Sans Culotte and the
Eagle. Id. More importantly, the report alleged that Americans
were aboard the privateers. Id.
309 Memorial from George Hammond, FOUNDERS ONLINE, (May
8, 1793), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/0125-02-0626 [https://perma.cc/9YBZ-F3XW].
310 Letter from George Hammond to Thomas (June 5, 1973),
FOUNDERS ONLINE,

https://founders.archives.gov/documents/

Jefferson/01-26-02-0191 [https://perma.cc/YNK3-9H8M].
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Secretary of War, Henry Knox, supported Randolph's
modification and Jefferson provided the lone dissent.
Following the meeting, Jefferson dispatched a letter to
the United States District Attorney for Pennsylvania,
William Rawle.
Jefferson, however, softened the
Administration's centralization efforts.
Rather than
write to Rawle as an executive official, Jefferson wrote as
if Rawle was a private attorney. Jefferson, consistent
with his preference for local action, left the charging
decision to Rawle writing, "I have it in charge to express
to you the desire of the Government that you would take
such measures for apprehending and prosecuting them
as shall be according to law." Jefferson's expression that
it was the "desire of the Government" indicates that he
did not personally advocate the action and that Rawle
should decide independently whether the law applied or
not. Jefferson instructed Rawle to contact Philadelphia's
Customs Collector and a merchant who allegedly
possessed information about "depredations on the
property and commerce of some nations at peace with the
United States."31 1 Rawle, who supported federal power,
immediately followed Jefferson's instructions and
learned that Gideon Henfield, a Revolutionary War
veteran, served as prize master on the Citizen Genet.312
Rawle found sufficient evidence for grand jury
311 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Rawle (May 15,
1793),

FOUNDERS

ONLINE,

http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-26-020032 [https://perma.cc/9MLA-XK2A].
312 William Rawle (1759-1836), PENN U. ARCHIVES & RECS.
CTR.,
https://web.archive.org/web/20150911230735/http://www.archi
ves.upenn.edu/people/1700s/rawlewm.html

(citing Rawle's Federalist
[https://perma.cc/D9LL-QJ39]
affiliation). Rawle's actions to investigate the matter are reproduced in Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1101 (D. Penn.
1793).
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consideration and later secured an indictment.
Ultimately, a jury acquitted Henfield. Only then, in early
August, did the Administration finally instruct the
Customs Collectors on neutrality enforcement.31 3
III. Federal Prosecutors
Inquisitors

as

Constitutional

Making
federal
prosecutors
the
nation's
constitutional inquisitors created two fundamental
issues that remain contested today. The first issue
entails who controls federal law enforcement power.
Jefferson's perspective preferred decentralized, local,
citizen-based control. Hamilton took the opposite view,
preferring centralized control. The second issue--related
to the first--entails the duty owed by the United States
District Attorneys to the federal government.
As
constitutional inquisitors, an expectation followed that
the District Attorneys would inquire into matters the
government deemed important. Although the District
Attorneys had leeway to perform their overall duties,
they responded to federal government instructions.
A. Centralization

Jefferson's objections illustrate a fundamental
problem with the nation's federalism. When determining
relative power between state and federal governments,
which powers and how much power does each possess?
Where does one begin and the other end? Jefferson and
Hamilton took decidedly different views on the answers.
313 Treasury Department Circular to the Collectors of the
Customs, 4 August 1793, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-15-02-0143 [https://perm
a.cc/MAP8-KGWT].
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Jefferson favored a national government limited to the
Constitution's terms. 314 If the Constitution did not
specifically give the federal government the power, then
the government did not possess it. This gave state and
local authorities more power.
Hamilton pursued
expansive
federal powers.31 5
Assuming state
revolutionary war debt and creating the Bank of the
United States illustrated this.3 16 These disputes divided

Hamilton and Jefferson and neutrality enforcement
expanded the divide. 317
Hamilton's plan to have his Customs Collectors
report neutrality violations directly to him replicated the
process used against merchants and shippers who
brought goods into the United States without paying

customs duties. His plan contained one key difference
that further centralized the process. When illicit goods
entered the United States they were subject to
forfeiture. 318 Customs Collectors identified violations
314

Jefferson was not an enthusiastic

supporter of the

Constitution. ELLIS, supra note 232, at 104. Though in France

during its drafting, he received a copy of the completed
document. Id. He believed that a Bill of Rights was essential
to cure the potential abuses inherent in the flawed document.
See id. No Constitution would have appealed to Jefferson. Id.
He preferred a government that could not be felt by the people.
Id. at 105; see also FERLING, supra 170, at 166-67.
315 WOOD, supra note 123, at 103 (noting that "Hamilton
wanted people to feel the presence of the new national
government.").

On the rift between Hamilton and Jefferson, see FERLING,
supra note 170, at 203-14. On the revolutionary war debt and
the Bank of the United States, see Elkins & McKitrick, supra
note 104, at 223-36. On the constitutional nature of these
316

debates, see Kramer, supra note 43, at 49.
317 FERLING, supra note 170, at 203-14.
318 On the complexity of the revenue collection statutes, see
Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law:
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and reported them to the District Court who heard the
evidence and forwarded an opinion to Hamilton, who
then decided whether to forfeit the goods.319
To
investigate neutrality, Hamilton circumvented the
District Court, ordering the Customs Collectors report
directly to Alexander Hamilton. Jefferson undoubtedly
recognized this distinction thus concluding that
neutrality enforcement was another means by which
Hamilton planned to expand federal executive power.
Jefferson opposed Hamilton's expansion plans by
arguing that Treasury should not oversee neutrality
enforcement. Jefferson believed either the War
Department or State Department should receive the
information, if anyone. Embedded in his objection is a
sign of Jefferson's distaste for Hamilton. Jefferson noted
the Treasury Department already had enough business,
patronage and influence. 320 Finally, Jefferson belittled
Hamilton's centralization plan by sarcastically arguing

FederalistFoundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 127880 (2006). On Hamilton's involvement in cases see for example
Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Duane (April 5,
1793), FOUNDERS ONLINE,

http://founders.archives.gov/docu

ments/Hamilton/01-14-02-0175
[https://perma.cc/55XU-NAD
8]. The process described in this paragraph is taken from a
review of records of the District Court for Pennsylvania from
1790 through 1795. See generally RAO, supranote 275, at 6768; Statements of Facts in Forfeiture Cases Appealed to the
Secretary of the Treasury, 1792-1918 (on file with the National
Archives in Philadelphia).
319 RAO, supra note 275, at 67-68.

320 On the relationship between Washington and Hamilton as
President and Treasury Secretary and the influence held by
Treasury, see WOOD, supranote 123, at 91-92.
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that the Customs Collectors should also build ships
because they were already located near the water. 321
The proposal Jefferson made also demonstrates a
preference for localized federal law enforcement over
executive branch control.
Jefferson placed law
enforcement in local hands by utilizing grand jurors and
district court judges. Grand jurors resided where court
was held. 322 In terms of neutrality enforcement this
meant most grand jurors would come from the port cities.
This included grand jurors drawn from Philadelphia and
Charleston, two of the nation's largest ports and
populated by those strongly favoring the French. 323 Yet
he undoubtedly realized that large northern port cities
such as Boston and New York identified more with the
British. Jefferson also knew that Washington's federal
judges were more pro-British in their orientation yet he
also gave them an important role. 324 As the group
responsible for charging the grand juries, Jefferson gave
judges a significant role in neutrality enforcement. 325
This also gave control to local authorities as the district
court judges served the district in which they resided. It

321

Jefferson's analogy fails because shipbuilding takes skill

while reporting

on neutrality violations simply

requires

observation.
322 Tarter & Holt, supra note 44, at 261-62 (2007) (outlining

the selection methods in each state).
323 Both cities hosted large celebrations upon French consul
Genet's arrival in their city. See AMMON, supranote 165, at 45,
54-57; CASTO, supranote 171, at 35, 53-54.
324

On

the

appointment

philosophy

of Washington

and

Hamilton, see WOOD, supra note 123, at 107-09.
On
Washington's appointment qualifications for Supreme Court
Justices, the Justices who were riding Circuit and would hear
the cases see CASTO, supranote 70, at 56.
325 On the importance of Grand Jury charges see CASTO, supra
note 70, at 128.
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also provided a check on federal law enforcement by
spreading authority over multiple groups.

Randolph's
response
conceded
Jefferson's
ideological points but favored Hamilton's plan. Randolph
analogized the Customs Collectors to any private citizen
witnessing

criminal

activity

by

centralizing

law

enforcement without saying it. Randolph argued that
private citizens could report crimes and did so
regularly. 326 Even if the Customs Collectors did not
report to the executive, nothing prevented them from
presenting their information to the court or grand jury on
their own accord. Therefore, according to Randolph,
requiring the Customs Collectors report to the United
States District Attorney provided procedural uniformity.
Randolph used the District Attorney as a
compromise between Hamilton's efforts to centralize the
government and Jefferson's preference for local control.
Like the judges and grand jurors, the District Attorneys
were local officials. If Jefferson supported local federal
judges overseeing neutrality enforcement, then Randolph
reasoned federal prosecutors taking the information from
Customs collectors was sufficiently similar. Including
the District Attorneys not only acknowledged Hamilton's
centralization plans but, by drafting these typically
judicial figures into the executive branch, Randolph
expanded the prosecutorial function. Randolph had
complained two years before about the need for Attorney
General control over the District Attorneys and likely
sought the opportunity to do this. 32 7 Randolph eventually

instructed the District Attorneys to proceed by
indictment when the Customs Collectors reported
violations.

326 Krent, supra note 121, at 292-95.
327 See supra notes 147-48.
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United

States

The Hamilton-Jefferson-Randolph discussion also
reveals competing conceptions of the prosecutorial
function.
Hamilton and Jefferson actually viewed
prosecutors similarly. Federal prosecutors were, at most,
supporting actors in criminal prosecution, who, like state
prosecutors, were part-time. Randolph took a more
progressive view by making prosecutors investigators,

key players in federal criminal law enforcement. They
could implement national policy.
Neither Hamilton's nor Jefferson's proposals
included the United States District Attorneys. Hamilton
envisioned the Customs Collectors reporting to him and
then Hamilton would initiate prosecutions, perhaps with
orders to the District Attorneys. Jefferson preferred
judges and grand jurors. While the details of Hamilton's
plan have been lost, Jefferson's argument reveals that,
despite his progressive ideas about government, he
perceived federal prosecutors the equivalent of their state
counterparts. Most importantly, Jefferson labeled grand
jurors the "constitutional inquisitors and informers of the
country." 328 He saw grand juries investigating neutrality

violations and issuing presentments about violations.
Only at this stage would prosecutors appear to simply

draft indictments.
Jefferson also implicitly dismissed prosecutors by
expressing more concern for those accused of violations.
He could not envision prosecutors investigating cases or

evaluating evidence prior to proceeding with a case.
Instead, he focused on false accusations. Using Customs
Collectors to provide the government with violation
reports would prejudice those suspected by making the
328 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph, supra
note 1.
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government presume guilt because of its distance from
the alleged violation and inability to collect its own
evidence. 329 Jefferson also anticipated the Customs
Collectors would use their power to frame rivals. 330 It is
conceivable Jefferson held the same concerns about
federal prosecutors. He favored grand jurors because
they only served for a single court term. 331 Prosecutors,
like the Customs Collectors, served at the pleasure of the
President. If Customs Collectors had the power to frame
rivals, the prosecutors possessed the same potential.
Most likely, Jefferson ignored the prosecutor's
potential power because he believed in the people's
ability

to

govern

themselves.

332

A

government

329 Id. The emphasis Jefferson placed on the accused presenting
evidence of innocence is fascinating. In today's criminal trials
defendants are not required to present any evidence of
innocence. At that time, defendants could not testify under
oath on their own behalf. Stanton D. Krause, Inquiry into the
Right of Criminal Juries to Determine the Law in Colonial
America, 89 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 111, 124 (1998); see
also FRIEDMAN, supra note 47, at 245. Therefore, Jefferson is
likely drawing on one of two ideas. First, he could be thinking
to an earlier time when defendants were required to present
evidence in their defense.
LANGBEIN, supra note 57
(particularly chapter 2). Second, he could be drawing on his
experience in France.

In European systems, the defendant

often presents evidence first and then the government presents
its evidence. PIZZI, supra note 52, at 89-116 (chapter five
describes four different European Court systems, noting in
several that the defendant must provide evidence first).
330 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph, supra
note 1.
331 See Tarter & Holt, supra note 44, at 262-63 (indicating the

"small percentage" of grand jurors who served longer than a
single term).
332 CHRISTIAN FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND
AMERICA'S

CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITIONS BEFORE THE

CIVIL
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prosecutor, especially one with increased power, was
anathema to Jefferson's government philosophy. In
France during the Constitutional Convention, he
observed the problems created by autocratic rule while
missing the democratic excesses experienced under the
Articles of Confederation. 333 Happy in France, he
reluctantly accepted Washington's offer to become
Secretary of State. 334 Once in office, Jefferson and
Hamilton soon clashed. 335 Jefferson abhorred Hamilton's
British sympathies and believed Hamilton wanted a
monarchical government in the United States.
To
Jefferson, monarchy was antithetical to liberty. 336
Liberty required minimal government. 337
Strong
executive power, such as prosecutorial power, did not fit
Jefferson's political ideology.
Attorney General Randolph, to Jefferson's
dismay, sought pragmatic solutions to political problems

&

WAR 129 (2009); WOOD, supra note 123, at 10 (quoting Mark A.
Noll, Common Sense Traditions and American Evangelical
Thought, 37 AM. Q. 216, 218 (1985)).
333 FERLING, supranote 170, at 165-67.
334 Id. at 206.
335 According to Elkins and McKittrick, the conflict with
Hamilton was inevitable because Jefferson's foreign policy
conflicted with Hamilton's domestic policy.
ELKINS
MCKITTRICK, supra note 104, at 210.

Hamilton's domestic

policy emphasized commerce with Britain. Id. Jefferson's
foreign policy was open commerce with all and, as a whole,
anti-British. Id.
336 TUCKER & HENDRICKSON, supra note 184, at ix.

337 Id. at 16. Jefferson would later abandon his ideological
principles out of political necessity. This demonstrates he had
the capability to consider strong executive action. In 1793,
however, Jefferson had not reached the point of necessity.
Jefferson also had the ability to separate his ideals from his
practical politics. Perhaps realizing that his political position
was a losing one, Jefferson allowed himself to wander into
idealism. See generally, ELLIS, supra note 232.
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rather than rigidly adhere to ideology. Unlike Jefferson,
Randolph played a key role in the Constitutional
Convention and presented the Virginia Plan. 338 During
the Convention, Randolph's opinion of the document
soured to the point that he would not sign it.339 A
centrist, Randolph did not want the people to have too
much power but was also wary of centralizing too much
power in a single executive. 340 Ultimately Randolph
supported the Constitution during Virginia's ratification
debate. 34 1 While Congress considered the Judiciary Act,
James Madison consulted Randolph, recognizing him as
one of the nation's leading legal minds. 342 One of
Randolph's significant critiques was the vague limits on
federal court jurisdiction. 34 3 Soon after, Washington
offered Randolph the Attorney General position. 344 By
1793, Randolph played a key advising role, serving as the
"middle position" between Hamilton and Jefferson. 345
His solution to neutrality enforcement was the latest
example.346

Searching for a compromise between Jefferson
and Hamilton, Randolph's proposal envisioned a wider
role for federal prosecutors than their state counterparts.
He saw United States Attorneys as part of federal law
enforcement. As a supporter of centralized government,
338 REARDON, supra note 130, at 96-100.
339 Id. at 98-119.
340 Id. at 102-08.
341 Id. at 139.
342 Marcus & Wexler, supra70, at 15.
343 REARDON, supra note 130, at 175.
344 Letter from George Washington to Edmund Randolph (Sept.
28, 1789), FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.
gov/documents/Washington/05-04-02-0073 [https://perma.cc/8
DYV-Q2YE].
345 REARDON, supra note 130, at 206-07.
346 Id. at 226.

[275]
77

Tennessee Journalof Law and Policy, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 1
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OFLAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 14 1 WINTER

2020

1 ISSUE 2

Randolph understood the need for the new government
to enforce its laws. As a political operative, Randolph
understood the need to balance federal and local
interests.
The District Attorneys fit requirements
perfectly. They were local. Each United States District
Attorney was from the state he served. At the same time,
each had ties to Washington and supported the national
government. 347 While many perceived the District
Attorneys as judicial officials, Randolph connected the
prosecutors with the Customs Collectors. He saw them
as partners in federal law enforcement.
Using federal prosecutors as inquisitors was a
novel idea.
State criminal justice was highly
decentralized. 348

No single role predominated.

When

criminal justice-related policies were created, there was
no guarantee they would be enforced. 34 9 In most state
prosecutions, if a prosecutor appeared, it was a private
prosecutor hired by the victim.35 0 Morals cases were the

lone exception. Grand jurors usually initiated these
cases.3 5 1 This was the inspiration for Randolph's response
to Jefferson. Like morals cases, the Customs Collectors
could report to the Grand Jury about neutrality
violations. For the morals case to progress, however, the
local prosecutor had to prepare the charging document.
Randolph likely saw federal prosecutors serving the same
function. 35 2 Therefore, it was a reasonable step for
Randolph to suggest that prosecutors pre-empt the grand
347 Ingram, supra note 104, at 189 (citing WOOD, supra note
123, at 106-10).
FRIEDMAN, supra note 36, at 211.

348

349 Id.

350 Steinberg, supra note 30, at 571.
351 YOUNGER, supra note 41, at 38-39.

&

352 This was, in fact, what happened as Randolph worked with
United States District Attorney William Rawle when drafting
the neutrality violation cases in Philadelphia. CUMMINGS
MCFARLAND, supra note 143, at 38.
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jury and work with Customs Collectors. This established
federal prosecutors as constitutional inquisitors.3 53
IV. The Practical Origins of Federal Criminal
Prosecution

The Administration's decision to connect the
Customs Collectors and the District Attorneys set the
precedent for future federal law enforcement by placing
prosecutors between the people and the courts. 354 Not
only would the Washington Administration's process
recur over the next fifteen years, but it began the steady
expansion of prosecutorial power that continues today. 355
Five years after the neutrality crisis, President John
Adams centralized sedition prosecutions through
Secretary of State Timothy Pickering.3 5 6 Ten years after
that, President Thomas Jefferson copied Hamilton's idea
when enforcing the Embargo Acts against the British. 357
After these events, prosecutors further developed their
relationship with federal law enforcement agents such
that today's prosecutors and agents jointly investigate
and prosecute cases. 358

353 Id. at 36.
354 William McDonald,

The Prosecutor's Domain, in THE

PROSECUTOR 27 (1979).
355 See generally id. at 15-51.
356 JOHN CHESTER MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND

SEDITION ACTS 73 (1951).
357 Douglas Lamar Jones,
"The Caprice of Juries": The
Enforcement of the JeffersonianEmbargo in Massachusetts, 24
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 307, 307 (1980).
358 Daniel Richman, Prosecutorsand Their Agents, Agents and
Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 749, 751-52 (2003).
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Five years after Jefferson and Randolph
exchanged their letters, the partisan divide widened.35 9
Washington, whose reputation held the factions together,
left the Presidency after 1796 and was replaced by Vice
President John Adams.36 0 Adams put aside commercial
problems with Britain to deal with the deteriorating
relationship with the French.36 1 As he did this, he came
under heavy criticism from Jefferson's supporters.3 6 2

Fearing that the dissent might undermine the still
fledgling national government, Congress passed, and
Adams enforced, a sedition law that prohibited people
from making false, critical statements about the
government.3 63 Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, an
ardent Massachusetts Federalist, assumed enforcement
responsibility.3 6 4 He scanned newspapers daily, looking
for hints of sedition and ordered the United States

359 FERLING, supra note 170, at 289-91 (explaining the political
tensions at the outset of the Adams Administration in 1796);
MILLER, supra note 356, at 40-44 (1951) (explaining the
political situation at the passage of the Alien and Sedition
Acts); Smith, supra note 121, at 176-80 (describing the
political context when passing the Sedition Act).
360

John Adams, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/

about-the-white-house/presidents/john-adams/ [https://perma.
cc/HGL3-55C9].
361 On the problems with France following the ratification of
the Jay Treaty and Adams' handling of it, see FERLING, supra
note 170, at 296-300.
362 MILLER, supra note 356, at 56-59 (identifying the need to
suppress dissent from French supporters as the basis for the
Sedition Act)
363 1 Stat. 596-597 (1798); MILLER, supra note 337, at 70.
364 MILLER, supra note 356, at 73; SMITH, supra note 121, at
182; Timothy Pickering, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S.
CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?

index=P000324 [https://perma.cc/7CNT-PWEJ].
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District Attorneys to do the same.36 5 He ordered several
newspaper editors and a Congressman from Vermont
prosecuted.3 66 He had judges instruct grand jurors to be
vigilant to identify seditious statements.36 7 This was just
as Jefferson feared in 1793: a centralized national
government using its power to coerce adherence to a law
that suppressed dissent.3 68

Ironically, ten years later, Jefferson imitated his
executive predecessors.3 6 9 This time, however, Jefferson
grappled with the British. 370 While France stabilized
under Napoleon's dictatorial rule, the British became the
United States' primary foreign policy problem. 371 To gain

leverage, Jefferson persuaded Congress to embargo trade
with Great Britain. 372 While perhaps in the national
interest, many merchants who relied on British trade for

365 MILLER,

supra note 356, at 88; SMITH, supra note 121, at

182-85.
366 The Congressman was Matthew Lyon. SMITH, supra note

121, at 221. Lyon came to the United States as an indentured

servant, bought his freedom and fought in the Revolutionary
War. Id. at 225. He was elected to Congress in 1797 and
immediately became a Federalist target. Id. at 221-22. Lyon

also published a newspaper in Vermont that challenged the
notion that the President was infallible and had made other
disparaging comments about the President. Id. at 225-26. For

details about the case and Lyon's conviction and sentence, see
SMITH, supranote 121, at 221-255.
MILLER, supra note 356, at 137-39.
368 TUCKER & HENDRICKSON, supra note 184, at 16.
367

369 Jones, supranote 357.
370 Id.
371 On the foreign policy problems at the start of the
Administration, see JON MEACHAM, THOMAS JEFFERSON: THE

ART OF POWER 413-14 (2012). On the problems with the British
at the start of the Embargo, see id. at 425-32.
372 Id.
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their livelihood vehemently opposed it.373 The opposition
caused embargo evasion to become a significant national
problem. 374
With violators spread throughout the
different ports along the Atlantic coast and no formal
federal law enforcement agency, Jefferson turned to the
group that had the potential to be "an established corps
of spies or informers" for enforcement. 375 Jefferson had
the Customs Collectors perform just as they did with
neutrality violations in 1793.376 Reports went to the
District
Attorneys
who
initiated
cases
when
377
warranted.
Within fifteen years of Randolph's pragmatic
policy proposal, the existing federal law enforcement
agents had established a consistent working relationship
with the District Attorneys such that it became the
default policy choice. The relationship continued to grow
as the United States expanded westward and the
national government assumed a larger law enforcement
role.378

Today's federal prosecutors work closely with
investigators to prosecute offenders. 379 Prosecutors must
rely on federal investigators to collect quality evidence. 380

373 Id. at 433; see also Jones, supra note 357, at 310 (1980).
374 Id.; see also WHITE, supra note 151, at 434-37.
375 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph, supra
note 1.
376 WHITE, supra note 151, at 434-37.

In many instances,

Jefferson employed Hamilton's proposal and reviews the
information directly from the Customs Collectors. Id. at 435.
377 Not all of the United States District Attorneys obeyed the
instructions, citing their disagreement with the policy. When
they offered to resign, Jefferson did not accept the resignations
because he did not believe political differences were grounds
for removal. Id. at 414-15.
378 FRIEDMAN, supranote 47, at 261-67.

379 Richman, supranote 358.
380 Id. at 758.
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They are also at the mercy of federal agencies regarding
the types of cases investigated. 381 Agencies such as the
Department of the Interior, which enforces criminal laws
relating to fish and wildlife, dictate how many agents are
dispersed around the nation and where they are
placed. 382 In areas with high agent concentrations, more
fish and wildlife cases will be sent to the local United
States Attorney's Office. 38 3
The reliance upon federal investigators to collect
evidence and bring cases began with Randolph's
proposal. Cases arising in Savannah, Georgia and in
Philadelphia exemplify the important role Customs
Collectors played.
In Georgia, the District Judge
circumvented the Customs Collector-and the United
States Attorney-and provided the grand jury with
evidence of a neutrality violation. 384 The grand jury
indicted but the case resulted in an acquittal, because the
In
Customs Collector and prosecutor did not act. 385
Philadelphia, the Customs Collector provided the
prosecutor with information regarding the William.38 6
Others brought information about other violations and
the grand jury indicted these too. 387 Rawle pursued only
381 Id.
382 Regional Law Enforcement Offices, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE
SERV. OFF. L. ENFORCEMENT, http://www.fws.gov/le/regional-

law-enforcement-offices.html
[https://perma.cc/6757-QY99]
(identifying the regions covered by the Fish and Wildlife
Service).
383 Id.

384 ALDERSON, supra note 207, at 115.

385 Id.
386 Minutes of the Grand Jury for the Special Session of the
Middle Circuit in the District of Pennsylvania (on file with the
National Archives in Philadelphia) (hereinafter Special
Session).
387

Id.
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one of these cases and that one he later dismissed. 388 In
both instances, the lack of cooperation from Customs
officials correlated with unsuccessful prosecutions.
Likewise, federal law enforcement agents must
work with prosecutors to complete their tasks. 389
Prosecutors often direct investigations, telling the agents

when the evidence is sufficient.39 0

In some instances,

agents must receive prosecutorial and judicial approval

prior to collecting certain evidence.39 1 Especially at the
federal level, prosecutors often draft the documents
requesting permission from the judge to obtain the
evidence. Prosecutors also lead task forces directed at
particular federal crime problems. These task forces
include terrorism, gun violence and drug distribution
organizations.3 9 2

They bring together agents from a

variety of agencies to address a specific problem.
Randolph's proposal also initiated this aspect of
the prosecutor-agent relationship.
By having the
Customs Collectors report to the United States District
Attorney, the prosecutor became the inquisitor. The
Customs Collector could not go directly to the grand jury
388

Id.

389 Richman, supra note 358, at 778-82.
390 Id.

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2012) (authorization to intercept
wire, oral or electronic communications); 18 U.S.C. § 3122
391

(2012) (application for a pen register or trap and trace device).
Search warrants are governed by FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a).

392 See, e.g., FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces, FBI, https://
www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism/joint-terrorism-task-forces
[https://perma.cc/U5X8-FAQD]; Project Safe Neighborhood,
U.S. ATTY'S OFF., DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, http://www.
justice.gov/usao-nh/project-safe-neighborhoods
[https://perma.cc/BDM4-A37K];
Organized Crime Drug
Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF), U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ADMINISTRATION, https://www.dea.gov/organized-crime-drug-

enforcement-task-force-ocdetf [https://perma.cc/XKC3-Q5SB].
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himself.
Instead, he delivered evidence to the
prosecutor.39 3 William Rawle, in Philadelphia, handled a
variety of matters the Customs Collector brought to
him.39 4 Likewise, Christopher Gore, in Boston, worked
with the Customs Collector to obtain evidence
incriminating the French consul in Boston for arming
privateers in Boston Harbor.3 95

Randolph's
pragmatic
solution
to
the
Jefferson/Hamilton proposals established the notion that
federal prosecutors are the nation's constitutional
inquisitors.
Prior to the neutrality crisis, federal
prosecutors only handled individual cases without
considering enforcement priorities. During the colonial
period and early statehood, governors did not dictate
morality prosecutions.3 96
Conversely, following the
exchange between Jefferson and Randolph, orders went
from Randolph to the United States District Attorneys
ordering them to pursue prosecutions.39 7
These
prosecutions were necessary not only to enforce criminal
law but also to demonstrate United States neutrality. 398
393 See Special Session, supranote 386.
94 Id.

395 HELEN PINKNEY, CHRISTOPHER GORE, FEDERALIST OF
MASSACHUSETTS, 1758-1827 52-55 (1969).
396 See David H. Flaherty, Law and the enforcement of Morals
in Early America, 1 CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICAN HISTORY

127, 146-47 (Erik H. Monkonnen ed. 1991); New York, supra
note 27, at 235.
The one exception to this might be
prosecutions for sedition or treason in the years leading to the
Revolutionary War. Carlton F.W. Larson, The Revolutionary
American Jury: A Case Study of the 1778-1779 Philadelphia
Treason Trials 61 SMU L. REv. 1441, 1453-55 (2008).
397 Letter from Edmund Randolph to William Channing (May
12,

1793),

N.Y.

PUB.

LIBR.

DIGITAL

COLLECTIONS,

http://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/bac0a75c-2673-b981e040-e00a18067fd9 [https://perma.cc/EW45-FTZJ].
398 Ingram, supra note 200, at 503-06.

[283]
85

Tennessee Journalof Law and Policy, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 1
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OFLAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 14 1 WINTER

Therefore,

these

cases were

2020

1 ISSUE 2

not

reactive

criminal

prosecutions but proactive matters.399

Finally, Randolph's resolution sowed the seeds of
a debate that has continued for nearly 225 years. When
Congress

passed

the

Judiciary

Act,

it

sought

to

decentralize prosecution, leaving it to local prosecutors to
handle cases in their preferred manner. 40 0 Randolph's
proposal to connect the Customs Collectors with the
District Attorneys led to the first set of orders issued to
local federal prosecutors from the Attorney General.
These orders were the central government's first effort to
control the United States District Attorneys and their
discretionary power. Of course, this initial attempt did
not resolve the matter. In fact, the history of federal
criminal prosecution can be seen as an effort to increase
centralization.
Prior to the Justice Department's
creation in 1871, several Attorneys General sought but
were denied control over federal prosecutors. 40 1 With the
Justice Department's creation, the Attorney General
began initiating cases from Washington, D.C. rather than
relying upon local United States Attorneys. Regulatory
cases came first, followed by sedition cases during World
War I. 402 Later, the Justice Department took control of

399 On the difference between "proactive" and "reactive" cases,
see John Hagan & Ilene Nagel Bernstein,

The Sentence

Bargaining of Upperworld and Underworld Crime in Ten
Federal District Courts, 13 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 467, 468-69
(1979).
400 See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
401 Huston, supra note 23, at 13 (President Andrew Jackson
seeks to give Attorney General control over criminal cases in
early 1830); CLAYTON, supranote 145, at 20 (Caleb Cushing, as
Attorney General, pushes for control over U.S. Attorneys in
1850s); Conner et al., supra note 107, at 757 (Lincoln gives
Attorney General control over the U.S. Attorneys in 1861).
402 FRIEDMAN, supra note 47, at 265.
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tax cases 40 3 and RICO cases. 40 4 Most recently it assumed
control over national security cases ranging from
terrorism to export control.40 5 The efforts to centralize
discretion have extended to establishing review authority
over Assistant United States Attorney hiring.4 0 6 Within
the last ten years, the Justice Department's
centralization
efforts
have
made
some prefer
decentralization. 4 7
A politically-oriented Justice
Department used its power to prosecute political rivals in
different parts of the country. 408 United States Attorneys
who did not advance these policy prosecutions were
fired.40 9 The firings and the public antagonism to them
trace
directly to Randolph's
solution to the
Hamilton/Jefferson differences and the desire to
centralize prosecutions despite the public's desire to
maintain local control.
403 Johnnie M. Walters, The Role of the Department of Justice

in Tax Litigation, 23 S. C. L. REV. 193, 194 (1971).
404
James D. Calder, RICO's "Troubled...Transition":
Organized Crime, Strategic Institutional Factors, and
Implementation Delay, 1971-1981, 25 CRIM. JUST. REV. 31, 33
(2000).
405 National Security Division: About the Division, U.S. DEPT.
JUST., http://www.justice.gov/nsd/about-division.

Lochner, supra note 10, at 280-88. For the duties of the
Executive Office for the United States Attorneys, see Mission
and Functions, OFF'S. U.S. ATTY'S, http://www.justice.gov/usao/
eousa/mission-and-functions [https://perma.cc/Q7SB-6BS5N].
407 See generally Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the
President Control the Department of Justice, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1
(2018) (discussing the "evolving understanding of prosecutorial
independence" that has categorized the continued existence of
the Department of Justice. Id. at 2).
408 See Beale, supra note 16, at 371; Daniel Richman, Political
Control of Federal Prosecutions: Looking Back and Looking
Forward, 58 DUKE L. J. 2087, 2121 (2009).
406

409 Eisenstein, supra note 16, at 219.
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V. Conclusion
The federal prosecutor's central role in criminal
justice administration was not pre-ordained or
inevitable, nor is it the only alternative.
Instead,
prosecutorial power grew from the need for a practical
compromise between competing ideologies.
While
Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton could not see
beyond their ideological objectives, Edmund Randolph
sought

a

pragmatic

solution

to

the

neutrality

enforcement problem. He placed prosecutors between
the people and the grand jurors. Prosecutors began
working with investigators to implement federal law
enforcement policy.
Once in that position, federal
prosecutors slowly increased their domain such that,
today,
they
inquisitors."410

410

are

the

nation's

"constitutional

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph, supra

note 1.
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